Daniel Goure writes:  The Obama Administration and the Medvedev-Putin government of Russia approach the issue of strategic arms control from diametrically opposed positions. For the U.S. administration the threats of concern are those posed by the nuclear weapons themselves in the event of crises, their potential for being proliferated or falling into the hands of terrorists, and the problem that the maintenance of a secure deterrent can create for the attainment of a positive relationship between Moscow and Washington. This reflects the views held by many U.S. strategists that the challenge to an improved political relationship is the maintenance of a security strategy based on deterrence.  The U.S. approach to nuclear arms control is based on a fallacy: that both sides would be better off if the role of nuclear weapons in their respective security strategies were minimized. Many U.S. observers mistakenly believe that Russia’s political and security interests are largely parallel to those of the United States. They assume that the threats the West sees from so-called rogue states and terrorist groups acquiring weapons of mass destruction are those that also concern Russia.  This is not the case. Today, Russia is in greater need of maintaining the mutual hostage relationship created by strategic deterrence than perhaps at any time since the end of World War Two. – Early Warning