Afghanistan: The View from the House

Afghanistan: The View from the House

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Congresswoman Jane Harman (D-CA)
Chair, Intelligence Subcommittee, House Committee on Homeland Security

Congressman John M. McHugh (R-NY)
Ranking Member, House Armed Services Committee

Moderator: William Kristol
Board Member, The Foreign Policy Initiative and Editor, The Weekly Standard

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Summary

Congresswoman Harman began by offering support for the President’s Afghanistan policy, saying it did not differ greatly from her own view on the issue. She emphasized three issues that remain paramount in dealing with South Asia.

First, Harman argued, the U.S. needs to ensure that no sanctuary exists in South Asia for American enemies. Second, she said, the U.S. strategy must be population-focused: basic law and order do not exist in much of Afghanistan, and corruption has flourished throughout the country; one way to engage the population, Harman noted, would be supporting Afghan-led Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). Third, she argued for involving the entire region in solving the problems in Afghanistan.

Harman said that while the additional 4,000 trainers proposed by President Obama is about the right number, the United States needs to exert greater effort in the civilian and diplomatic spheres as well, with efforts such as Richard Holbrooke’s agricultural assistance initiative.

Harman also argued for some kind of metrics for measuring security and stability in Afghanistan – while some metrics have to remain private, Harman called for a few benchmarks that the American people can use to get a sense that the United States is achieving success in the country.

Congressman John McHugh followed Rep. Harman by offering, like many of the other panelists at the event, his support for Obama’s Afghanistan plan.

McHugh agreed with Harman that Congress needs a larger role in the process, arguing that the Congress has a great degree of influence on executive policy. The role of the minority party, McHugh stated, was to bring transparency to the process. While McHugh also argued for benchmarks in Afghanistan, he stated that they should not be unrealistically low or high, so as not to set ourselves up for failure.

McHugh agreed with members of the panel before him, stating that the executive branch should announce the remainder of the troops now, because he said waiting to announce a troop increase later will give our enemies the impression that the United States is failing and has been forced to increase its presence in Afghanistan as a result.

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Transcript

MR. KRISTOL: I was on the trip to Munich for the National Security Conference with Jane Harman, and we were planning this conference. And I asked if she would come. She was kind of enough to say if she could work it out with her schedule, she would.

And I said what Republican member would you recommend for a thoughtful and serious discussion, and she said John McHugh.

And then I saw Mr. McHugh about two or three weeks ago to talk about the defense budget, and I said if I finalize this, and I said what Democratic member would you recommend, and he said Jane Harman.

But, actually, the truth is these are two of the most thoughtful members of Congress on national security matters. Jane Harman was ranking member of the House Intelligence Committee, now Chairman of the Intelligence Subcommittee of Homeland Security. Mr. McHugh is ranking member on House Armed Services.

Both, I think, came to the House in the same year, 1993; is that right?

CONGRESSWOMAN HARMAN: And served on Armed Services together.

MR. KRISTOL: And served on Armed Services together.

CONGRESSMAN MC HUGH: She was much younger, though.

(Laughter.)

MR. KRISTOL: I will stay out of that.

Thank you. It is an awfully busy time, obviously, this week in Washington and on the Hill, so thank you both for coming.

Congresswoman Harman will speak for ten minutes or so from the podium, and then Mr. McHugh. And then we will have a discussion about the points that they raise.

Ms. Harman.

(Applause.)

CONGRESSWOMAN HARMAN: I want to thank Bill and congratulate Dan -- I don't know where Dan is, father-to-be for the second time in another week -- on founding a new organization. What Washington needs is another think tank. But what Washington does need is thoughtful people coming together to think about the issues. And many people in this new organization are people I have known for many years and interact with regularly.

Bill did not tell you the whole story of the Munich delegation this year. Here is the deal. John will find this amusing. At the last minute the seven Senators who were part of the ten-member delegation, three members from the House and seven from the Senate, had to cancel because there was an all-weekend, enlightening conversation about -- I think it was the stimulus package. So they couldn't come.

That left the House delegation in charge. That is a good start. The House delegation was Harman, Tauscher and Sanchez, all female, all Californians. So I announced, as the senior member, that we were going to have a slumber party on the plane. Bill was extremely uncooperative. He is clueless about what women do.

(Laughter.)

CONGRESSWOMAN HARMAN: On the other hand, this is a good start.

John McHugh gets it. We were elected together. We served together on Armed Services for years. We served together on Intelligence for years. And he is a thoughtful, enlightened -- I didn't remember -- that is a cute story that we suggested each other to do this, but why not. So, of course, we are going to agree, or, if we don't agree, John McHugh will learn in the next few weeks that I was right.

At any rate, I appreciate the invitation to be here. Many of you are my friends. I think it is just absolutely critical that we are thoughtful and deliberative about the tough challenges facing the United States. I have been panned a bit for agreeing to come down here in the blog world because the new neo-con organization -- what is Harman doing in the new neo-con organization?

My answer is I'm talking to some friends, and I am, you know, representing perhaps a different point of view. But when there is a tough job to do, I think a woman needs to do it.

So some are saying -- we are talking about Afghanistan, right? Some are saying that this breaks down to two points of view. One is the, quote, Republican view, which is that the Bush muscular approach in Iraq worked, and let's use it again in Afghanistan. And, oh, by the way, if that doesn't work, let's call the Afghanistan adventure Obama's war. This is the alleged Republican view.

The alleged Democratic view is that the British and the Soviets failed to win in Afghanistan; and therefore, should we continue to be there, it will become a Vietnam-like quagmire for the U.S., too. And that is a point of view that I have heard expressed by some people who are Democrats. But, not surprisingly, I disagree with both views.

And I think that Obama's take on this is pretty close to my view, and I have read some comments by some of you -- I won't reveal your names -- that are pretty positive about the Obama approach, because it is both a potential kinetic approach, but it also has many other dimensions. And so let me just talk about it or talk about how I see it and why I think it is the way to go.

First of all, I would sort of put my views in three baskets about what we need to do about Afghanistan and the region. One, I think we do need to limit our objective to making certain there is no sanctuary in Afghanistan or Pakistan for our adversaries, but that limited objective has to be in a context. And that context has to be that we are helping both Afghanistan and Pakistan to develop good governance.

And why do I think that matters? I think only if there is adequate governance and civil capacity in these countries, which there is not now in either of them, will there be the public buy-in necessary to achieve the objective of no sanctuary for our adversaries.

Second, I think that the U.S. strategy in this region must be population-focused -- this relates to my first point -- not enemy-focused. Basic law and order do not exist in most parts of Afghanistan, for example. So, obviously, as we all know, village-leadership warlords and Taliban-style justice have filled the gaps. That is not a good situation.

The current U.S. practice, or what has been U.S. practice, to support warlords, I think, has led to massive amounts or fed massive amounts of corruption in the country. And that is not good for any successful strategy. So I think we need to invest much more heavily in something that I believe Obama plans to do, and that is helping Afghan-style PRTs, much as we helped Iraqi-style PRTs, succeed by providing the right advisers and trainers, and so on and so forth, and very targeted expertise.


Finally, the last point, to paraphrase from Hillary Clinton, it takes a region not just a village, and an engaged international community to root out the Taliban and stabilize the area. I think Richard Holbrooke is right to call the area Af-Pak. That seems to have taken hold. But it is not just Af-Pak. It is also India and the entire region that is relevant.

And in case anyone missed it, there is a conference starting today at The Hague, and I think that conference is probably the right setting to roll out this more nuanced, I think, better U.S. policy, and it is a test of a lot of things. It is a test of NATO; it is a test of Obama's leadership; and it is a test of a lot of folks who are going to be there, including interestingly Iran. It will be interesting to see what they say.

There was an article in the paper, I think today, about Iran talking about the narco traffic in Afghanistan and why that matters to Iran. So let's just see what comes out of that.


And, by the way, I don't think our policy, new policy, is perfect. I thought there was a very good suggestion yesterday from Doug Fife. I don't know -- is Doug here? No. Why isn't Doug here to listen to me?

(Laughter.)

CONGRESSWOMAN HARMAN: (Continuing) -- who wrote in yesterday's "New York Times" that our efforts need to be accompanied by a communications strategy for the region. I think this is absolutely right. They have one. We don't. I see Ashley nodding. Hi, Ashley. How are you?

And, you know, it is kind of ironic that folks who would take us back to the seventh century are more advanced communicators then we are, but they are. And we lack a communication strategy at our peril.

So I think I have covered my basic points. I think that the choice of 4,000 trainers, U.S. trainers -- I gather NATO may -- may provide some more -- is about the right number. I think that surging in other ways, economic and diplomatic help, is exactly right. And I think that the final goal of the strategy, which is ridding the Afghan economy, at least focusing on Afghanistan, from a reliance on drugs, a drug-based economy, is critical.

The drug-based economy of Afghanistan threatens the entire region, and that is a good reason why, again, I think Iran is at the table in The Hague today.

Richard Holbrooke's agricultural assistance initiative is the kind of program that can work. But if we are going to transition Afghanistan to growing other crops, we also have to guarantee that those crops can get to market. And guaranteeing safe transit across a series of countries, given who is blocking the roads, is a very hard task. And it is one that we and NATO and, hopefully, the Afghans are going to have to work at.

So what is our goal? Our goal is to eliminate the sanctuary and put both Af and Pak on a much more secure and stable footing. The brutal attacks in Pak yesterday are a signal that this is getting -- could be getting harder, not getting easier.

And, by the way, another thing that I think is still an impediment to our getting Pakistan policy right is their refusal to let us question A. Q. Khan, who I continue to believe may be by their lights the father of their nuclear industry, but by my lights he is an international outlaw who had more to do with the nuclear sophistication of North Korea and Iran probably than any other person.

And I was never persuaded -- I don't know what John's view is -- based on briefings I got on the intelligence community, that we knew we had wrapped up his network. So I think questioning him and making certain we know what he knows is something we should absolutely insist on.

We have under-resourced Afghanistan for too long. I think Friday was signaling a course correction. We took our eye off the ball while we were bogged down in Iraq. I'm not arguing about the surge, the late surge, but I think for a few years we did not have a plan that made any sense in Iraq. And all of our resources had to be devoted to that region, especially intelligence resources, which deprived us of really knowing about the Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan.

So let me just finally say that I'm not sure how this ends or when this ends, but a key will be -- and this was part of what Obama announced -- the provision of metrics to measure our success. I had a conversation with Admiral Mullen this morning. I ran into him, and I said, so where are the metrics? And he said they exist. And so I said, well, what are they? And he said, well, we're not sure we are going to discuss those publicly.

Well, that may be a good strategy. I don't know. But I think that Congress is an independent branch of government. Let us remember that even though the last administration thought we were a nuisance -- and sometimes we are, and sometimes we are dysfunctional -- let us remember that we are an independent branch of government. And I think something we could productively do is, both in open and closed sessions, make certain that there were good metrics to apply to Afghanistan, and that, whatever they are, those benchmarks are being achieved. And if they are not achieved, something happens.

We have to hold this administration accountable for its plan in Afghanistan. A lot of our treasure, both human and financial -- whatever is left of the second -- are going to have to be spent in Afghanistan. And I certainly want us to have a very careful, clear-eyed view of what the stakes are there. I personally think they are high. I would hope we would do well. I think the President is on the right track, and I'm here to help.

And I obviously know we are going to do Q and A. So please welcome the real act, John McHugh.

(Applause.)

CONGRESSMAN MC HUGH: That felt like a setup, but I will roll with it. We always try to learn. I have been here about ten minutes on stage, and I have learned a few things.

One, that Jane Harman is very modest, because in every dealing I have ever had with either a member of Congress or the State Department when they have just come back from wherever it is you are talking about, they say, well, having just returned from the region.

She just returned from Afghanistan yesterday, and she never mentioned that. And how she could roll off a plane and look this great, as she always does, is amazing to me as well.

The thing that really didn't surprise me, as I was reading the press as I came over here this morning, it was all McCain to do a panel; McCain and Harman to talk about issues. You had to go to about page 14 to find that I was going to be here. It was kind of like I know, when I die in a plane crash, it will say "also killed."

(Laughter.)

CONGRESSMAN MC HUGH: But I truly am honored. I truly am honored to be here, whatever page or paragraph I appear in.

And I in all seriousness want to say I could not share a stage with someone whom I more admire and I more appreciate the intellect of than Jane Harman. We are both fugitives now from the intelligence community.

And I don't know about you, Jane, but I feel much more intelligent for it. Maybe we can talk about that a bit later.

Thank you to FPI. Thank you to Bill, Dan, and others who have worked so hard to create this new body that, as Jane suggested, may not on a numerical value be absolutely necessary, but from an intellectual value, and I do believe is that.

Bill and Jane both were kind enough to talk about my intellect. So I want to start on that high level. Let me begin by quoting that font of great American wisdom, Homer Simpson, who once said, you know, I don't care what situation you are dealing with in life. You really only need three phrases. The first is: Cover for me. The second is: Sounds good to me, boss. And the third is: It looked like that when I got here.

What is the point? The point is when then candidate Barack Obama was out on the campaign trail last fall, he spent a great deal of effort trying to recast Afghanistan as the good war, the just war, the war we had to win. I don't know this, but I suspect, particularly leading up to the release of the announcement of the new strategy last week, on one occasion he had to think let's throw up our hands and say it looked like that when we got here, and propose a strategy that was more narrowly focused, that was clearly, at least in the short term, less expensive in terms of blood and treasure, that probably was far less difficult in terms of his political base.

And I want to start off by saying he didn't do that. And I want to thank him, and I want to give him credit.

By saying we are going to take a whole-of-theater approach, by saying we recognize that both Pakistan and Afghanistan are linked in sometimes subtle, sometimes very overt but very important ways, by recognizing that we have to build both our military and civilian capabilities and capacities in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, by recognizing that we have to re-engage our ISAF and NATO partners in more and hopefully productive ways, and on and on and on, I can only say to the President, it sounds good to me, boss.

But I have to tell you this is the start of the road, and Jane mentioned this in her comments. This is where it gets interesting. This is kind of like the part of the movie toward the end when the lights go off, the thunder and lightning strike, and you find out there is a really creepy creature in your midst.

In our House there is about potentially 435 very scary creatures. We are called Representatives, thank you. But I have to tell you, as Jane said, Congress matters. We are going to have a play in this process, and I don't care if you go back to Vietnam. I don't care if you discuss the date that occurred in the '06 and '07 Iraq surge. Congress has a way of influencing and transporting its opinions into executive policy.

I suspect -- I didn't get a chance to talk to him directly, but I suspect that is why President Bush vetoed not one but two wartime supplemental bills: Recognition that, yes, money is important, but there were very significant inhibiters on how and in what ways we could use our troops in those kinds of circumstances.

So we have got to become very realistic with the fact that, look, I'm sure -- we did not -- I did not hear the first two panels, but I'm sure there was a great deal of informed analysis. I'm certain as well that as we go forward from this point, there will be a great deal of very serious discussion among serious scholars.

But, to be effective, foreign policy cannot stop at the think-tank door. It has to be carried through the halls of Congress and on to the President's desk. We saw it in Iraq, and I suspect in some way yet to be determined we are going to see it in Afghanistan.

Now, I don't want to suggest to you that the political road that we saw in the development of the Iraq debate will be the same this year as it was at that time. It won't. But I do believe that the similarities, when properly applied, can instruct us in the differences, if we look at them wisely, and should inform us. And obviously, the most clear difference is the fact we now have an administration that is of the same party as the majority party of both houses in Congress.

What does that mean? Well, we are going to have a debate on this. But what it does mean is that it is going to evolve in different ways. Perhaps we can call it the choreography of that debate.

In '07, at least from my perspective, as I was looking forward -- and I use that word advisedly -- to the debate -- or excuse me, the elections in '08, the debate was very vigorous. It was protracted, and pretty much by Washington standards it was out there for everyone to see. It was pretty visible.

It is going to change this year to the extent that it happens. It would seem to me -- and this is not a criticism -- one of the key objectives of the Obama administration has to be to try to do what it can to keep Afghanistan from becoming a political liability, from driving his party apart. To think anything differently, I think, would be unreasonable. It would be foolish, and, clearly, from a partisan perspective, that makes a great deal of sense.

What does that mean in terms of the debate? Well, I think it means rather than in '07 when the discussions occurred largely in the committee rooms and on the House floor, the debate this time is going to occur in the caucus rooms in the offices of the leadership.

And our responsibility, as a part of the minority, is to do what we can to bring clarity and transparency to that. We can't determine the outcome, but we can try to affect the process, and we are going to try to do that. We are going to work to try to preserve those things we view as absolutely essentially and necessary.

And that means, frankly, by and large, what the President has already outlined: A robust, counterinsurgency policy that works both on paper and in the battlefield and, even more importantly, that has a successful component out in the streets and the villages where really hearts and minds determine who wins and who losses.

You know, General Petraeus noted in his comments before the Munich Security Conference that a truly effective counterinsurgency program and effort strives to, as he put it, secure and serve the population.

And then he went on to talk about what worked in Iraq and what we can apply in Afghanistan. That includes building the capacity and the capability of the Afghan national security forces, as well as perhaps more importantly giving local citizens a stake in the process, a hope for a better tomorrow; the recognition that unlike those who are trying to defeat us and trying to upset our objectives, we are here for the long haul. We need to give our Pakistan and our Afghanistan or ISAF partners a new objective on which we can all agree, the belief that, as I said, we are committed to this cause.

That is not a half-in strategy. That is not an opportunity to say, well, we can narrow down these objectives. We can try to leave as we have in the past the sorry Afghan history of opportunities missed, of missions left unfulfilled, of challenges left unmet.

And I have to tell you that I think this may serve as our last true opportunity to get this right. If this were Texas- hold-em, we are not going to bluff our way to this pot. We have to be all in. And again to his credit, I think the President has given us the opportunity to do that.

On our side that means we are going to fight to do everything we can to maintain the policy as at least it was briefed to us last Friday. Now, I will tell you, it is going to be reasonable to adjust our objectives, to make the changes that are necessary on the road forward, to make sure we are responding to the realities on the ground.

But I don't think that should provide an opportunity for those who previously espoused what has become kind of euphemistically known as a minimalist approach. And I worry that some of my colleagues in the House who just last fall were out on the campaign trail saying, yes, we can -- and that is not a partisan statement; both parties did it; yes we can -- are now with respect to Afghanistan saying, well, you know what? Maybe we can't, or maybe we shouldn't, or maybe we ought to pause and think about this for a while.

Iraq in the final analysis was built simply up by a comprehensive and coherent and fully resourced counterinsurgency strategy. We can't accept anything less in Afghanistan and the Pakistan view.

Just a couple of other viewpoints.

Benchmarks: I support benchmarks. I was one of first members of the House to write a bill implementing benchmarks to assess our progress or lack thereof in Iraq. But what concerns me and what I expressed to Admiral Mullen yesterday and Secretary Gates just last week is that benchmarks cannot be utilized to try to effect a different outcome. We can't set the bar so high as to guarantee failure or so low as to fabricate success.

Troop strength: The president has made a start, but I would argue it is only a start. There seems to be some confusion as to the number of troops General McKiernan has asked for. I was there. I just returned from the region about five weeks ago.

(Laughter.)

CONGRESSMAN MC HUGH: General McKiernan was still speaking about the need for 30,000 or so troops. The President has made a good start towards that. I believe they ought to announce the remainder of those troops now. And I believe they ought to announce them not that that will get them to the theatre necessarily any more quickly; but, rather, because to do it later risks sending the wrong message. It risks suggesting to those who wish us ill or failure that we are not succeeding, and more troops are necessary.

More importantly the announcement of the troops now suggests the earlier point I made: We are there to see this through. And from everything I know about the President, from everything I have heard, that is precisely what he wants to see happen. And for whatever it is worth, I would counsel him to do that.

The focus on the training of the security forces is certainly a positive step. But I suspect many in this room believe, as I do, we need to grow those troops further, and we need to grow them faster. For all of the good effect that the President's announcement of 4,000 additional trainers does, it really doesn't do anything to accelerate the time line, 134,000 for the Afghan National Army by the end of 2011.

We have to do it better. We have to do it faster. And we probably are going to have to grow that National Army to 200,000, perhaps 250,000, with a similar increase to the Afghan National Police.

I would tell you that that expansion is absolutely necessary and has to be looked at in one way and one way only, a component of a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy. Growing the Afghan national security forces cannot be looked at as an alternative to a fully robust, population-based coin strategy.

Let me just say in closing the most significant name coming out of the first Gulf War, General Norman Schwarzkopf, was reported to have said, you know, the truth is we always know what the right thing is to do. The hard part is doing it.

We know what the right thing to do is here. I think the President clearly articulated the right thing to do. Our job as members of Congress in the days and weeks ahead is to ensure that the resources and the means are there to carry that through. This is far too important a challenge to once again miss an opportunity. So thank you and I look forward to your questions.

(Applause.)

MR. KRISTOL: Let me just ask you each one question and then take a couple from the floor. I think I will go in reverse order, just to pick up on something you were talking about, Mr. McHugh.

I would say, just as a layman looking at the situation in Afghanistan and having followed Iraq closely, one of the most striking things about Iraq when I went there in the summer of '07 was when you met with General Petraeus and then General Odierno, the Corps Commander, and then with Ambassador Crocker, you had the sense of unity of command, both in terms of the unity of effort between civilians and military and obviously a military chain of command that works in a way that I think historians will record as one of the real achievements in U.S. military history. I think it is a pretty conventional, common view that that has not been the case either in terms of the military command or the military civilian coordination in Afghanistan.

How much should we worry about that? How much do you think President Obama and, for that matter, General Petraeus can fix this? I mean how big a problem is that for us? You mentioned several other issues of resources and the like, but not that one.

CONGRESSMAN MC HUGH: Well, that's an excellent point. I mean it is one thing to lay a strategy out there, and I think as most people perhaps outside this room look at Iraq they think of a strategy as simply more military forces. And as central and critical as that was, it was a great deal more than that. And the components of it are, by and large, as you define them.

I think the President has defined the larger challenge of that. He speaks of both civilian and military aid on both the Afghan and the Pakistan side; 1.5 billion in civilian aid to the Pakistanis as we go forward. The problem is, ultimately, how do you coordinate that.

And that really is an on-the-ground adjustment, a fine- tuning of the pistons, as you will. I had a chance to chat with Admiral Mullen yesterday, and my impression is they understand that. They took that lesson from Iraq. They are going to have to make the on-the-ground adjustments that are necessary to fit this same strategy from Iraq, but fit it in different circumstances in Afghanistan.

And, clearly, as President Obama lifted off today in Air Force One to the G20, one of the key objectives, noneconomic, is to have discussions with our allies who are, in all likelihood, going to be asked to step forward on this. So it is a work in progress, but I'm relatively comforted by how the administration has rolled it out thus far.

MR. KRISTOL: Good. Jane, can you comment on that? But also I would just say a word about allies. You were in Munich and talked to our own NATO ambassador and also, of course, to high-level representatives from the allies.

How much can they do? How much does it matter back home how much they do in terms of political support? And then on the political question, I personally wonder if people are overstating the political risks. I mean at home. And that is to say I think most Republicans are not the ones that jump ship the moment it gets difficult and opportunistically look to take advantage of this and make it Obama's war.

And I also think most Democrats, in fact, are inclined to support their President. But I'm curious as to how you see that going forward. And do you see sort of points of greatest risk or inflection points where the political support could really become dicey?

CONGRESSWOMAN HARMAN: Well, let me comment on what John said and answer that question.

I think the aid mission in Afghanistan is broken, not only the U.S. piece of that, which is broken. Hillary Clinton was pretty articulate about that yesterday. There is major work to do to coordinate and organize what we are going to do in the nonmilitary piece of our help for Afghanistan.

But internationally it is broken. And one of Richard Holbrooke's assignments, so I understand, is to rationalize this, not just for us, but hopefully to build international support for some well-coordinated aid program. And, you know, it couldn't start sooner. That is a different situation in Iraq. It is just not comparable.

And you are right that the Petraeus/Crocker relationship was unprecedentedly good. And, hopefully, we will get something like that in Afghanistan, but we are not there.

On the other point on political support, it is pretty clear to me that the European public does not understand what NATO is doing in Afghanistan at all. They just don't get the fact that training in the Fatah could lead to -- and I would argue is likely to lead to -- further attacks in Europe by folks who have been there.

The biggest risk in Europe is in Britain where a huge amount of the population is of Pakistani origin or Pakistani descent, and they take a month's vacation in Pakistan every year. Well, most of them see Grandma, but some of them don't. And they have the right travel documents to come back to Britain. We have already see this movie. But also under the visa-waiver program, guess what. They can come to us as well. There are also Americans training in the tribal area.

So that narrative is not well understood in Europe. There has been huge pressure on governments -- and they responded to it -- not to commit much to the NATO mission. It is very clear -- and you all understand this very well -- that NATO is bifurcated. I wouldn't even say "bifurcated." It is probably 80/20 in terms of what commitments it has made just of its own troops to the military mission in the south of Afghanistan, a very small commitment, but there have been larger commitments of nonmilitary aid.


Our strategy seems to be now to ask for what NATO countries are willing to give. I think that is the pragmatic way forward. I don't know what the moral lesson of that is. NATO is supposed to be one team, one fight, and I don't think it is quite executing that way in Afghanistan.

As far as support here, I think people are lining up to support the President. I agree with John, and I appreciated what he said: That the policy that was articulated Friday is pretty darn sensible. Now we have to see how it plays. But I think if the economy does not improve here -- and there are glacial signs that at least in the mortgage market, something very important to California, it is improving -- but if it doesn't improve, people are going to have no tolerance, regardless of the rest of this, for more money.

And if the mission is not clearly understood here and we have casualties, increasing casualties in Afghanistan, which we will have, that could also lead to a backlash.


So, I agree with you, Bill, and I agree with John that generally there is support right now, and we seem to be on a solid footing. I would hope we will execute this well, and it won't take a lot of time.

I mean my goal -- and by the way, John, I think when you add the 130,000 Afghan troops plus the 80,000 or 90,000 Afghan police, you get to larger numbers faster in the police function. If they can execute it well, it is just as important as the, I think, military role there in terms of providing stability and safety for people.

So it doesn't -- I think we are going to get to large numbers there faster. And they have a history -- this is maybe different from Iraq -- of being very tough, good fighters. So if they are well-trained, I think we are going to see a very different situation than we have seen in Iraq.

CONGRESSMAN MC HUGH: Jane, I agree with you that the difference right now on the police and army side is the army, by and large, is pretty effective, the ones we have fielded at the eighty-plus thousand. The police are not quite there.

CONGRESSWOMAN HARMAN: I agree. I agree.

CONGRESSMAN MC HUGH: And we have to bring it together. I think we have got to grow both.

CONGRESSWOMAN HARMAN: I agree.

CONGRESSMAN MC HUGH: And all I'm suggesting is that NATO is going to be an important part of that.

And let just add a couple of comments to what you said. I'm deeply concerned about the future of NATO. Afghanistan is a proving ground for it, and to this point it has been a pretty unproductive one. Many of the allies in NATO are now beginning to question their Article V guarantees. That is breathtaking to me, and we have got to go forward and waive -- stop asking. As much as it kind of ignores the shortcomings momentarily of NATO right now, stop asking for those things that perhaps they can provide but they won't, or those things they can do but they won't, but asking them for things that they can do and they will.

And I think that is why the President has asked and intends to go on the training aspect, because, hopefully, that will be an opportunity to kind of bring it all together. But we are in a very uncertain position on NATO right now, and I am very concerned about it.

MR. KRISTOL: I think I can add one word on an underappreciated benefit of President Obama's all-in or mostly-all-in announcement on Friday. I had dinner with Stephen Harper, the Canadian Prime Minister, Sunday in a pretty small group. And he has been courageous in sticking with the mission and taking along his own party, which is reluctant. They have taken very heavy casualties in the south and have fought very well.

And he said, you know, his life -- I mean, it is still not wildly popular in Canada, but the fact that President Obama -- not President Bush, but President Obama -- has said this is urgent and this is important is going to make it easier for him to sustain support in Canada.

I have to think some of that would be true in other NATO allies. And it will be interesting to see, I suppose, with President Obama there this week, how much that translates into actions on the ground. It is a test for the alliance.

I think, frankly, those who have a reputation in Europe as good multilateralists and good advocates of the U.S./European relationship -- I know you have done a lot of this actually, Jane -- but they can do a lot over the next few weeks and months to make clear, I think, how damaging it will be back here in terms of U.S. perceptions of NATO and the U.S. weighing of their concerns in a bunch of other areas if on this, which is the core NATO mission of the last several years, if they don't end whatever qualms they had about Iraq and President Bush.


Now it is President Obama saying we have to do this in Afghanistan. I think it is a big test moment for them, and they should understand the implications of not stepping up.

CONGRESSWOMAN HARMAN: Well, we do have just on that point somebody in the Obama inner circle who is very well qualified to push that point. And his name is Jim Jones, who we all know in his last life or a couple back was SACEUR and was instrumental in helping to define some of the modern NATO missions and cares intensely about it. So, hopefully, he will communicate that.

MR. KRISTOL: We have time for just maybe one or two quick questions and quick responses. How about in the back there. Someone had his hand up.

MR. CAMPBELL: Hi, Jason Campbell from Brookings. My question is in regard to metrics. In last week's speech the President was fairly demonstrative in stating that the metrics would provide the American public a tool by which to judge progress in Afghanistan. And if I'm not mistaken, he also said that there would be some degree of coordination with Congress in determining these metrics.

Congressman Harman, your statement suggests that not only has there been minimal, if any, coordination in determining these metrics, but that the Administration is thus far reluctant to make those public. I guess, first, am I reading this right; and, second, aren't we off to a bad start if Congress out of frustration comes up with a separate set of benchmarks in metrics that may or may not be in line with those of the administration?

CONGRESSWOMAN HARMAN: Well, I don't serve on the Armed Services Committee any longer. John does, so he may know.

CONGRESSMAN MC HUGH: We miss you, Jane. Trust me.

CONGRESSWOMAN HARMAN: Thank you. It was a much better committee when I served on it.

(Laughter.)

CONGRESSMAN MC HUGH: That's why we miss you.

CONGRESSWOMAN HARMAN: But there has been consultation with the Hill, both with the leadership and with key leaders of committees. So I don't assume that the Congress is in the dark about metrics.

But there has not been -- at least if there was, I missed it -- any very detailed public list of what those metrics are. And in the conversation I had with Mullen this morning -- I saw him in an event that focused mostly on how we treat veterans -- he said that some of this would not be public.

My response to that is, okay, I don't know that every single thing needs to be out there, but surely the public, if we want the public to continue to support this venture, has to have a feeling that it is focused and solid and succeeding. So my response to you is Congress does have a role to play here.

I think even though, as John points out, I'm in the majority party with an administration of the same party, I think as an independent, as a member of an independent branch of government, it is my responsibility to make certain that my administration, or our administration, is accountable for the policy it sets out.

CONGRESSMAN MC HUGH: I think, by and large, what you posit is correct. But I'm not sure that is a criticism yet. I think, frankly, the question of the benchmarks, at least in my discussions with Admiral Mullen and Secretary Gates, is that, well, we are working on these things, and at the appropriate time we will bring them to Congress. That may not ultimately be the case. If it is not, then I have got a criticism that I need to share with whomever cares to listen.

As you perhaps heard my comments, benchmarks are, I think, appropriate. And I would agree with Jane. I don't think you necessarily have to put out a press release on every one, because then it becomes a political tool. But I don't want that political perspective to change the dimension of the challenge and change the metrics that we already have on the policy itself.

Again, setting the bar so high you cannot possibly reach it, we fail; we leave. Setting it so low that we uncork the champagne bottles and walk out, even though success has not been achieved.

I suspect that the military folks are thinking about metrics like, well, we have set a bar for 134,000 by the end of 2011 on the Afghan National Army. Did we meet it? If not, again when Congress gets its hands in there, I'm not sure how that all comes out.

So it is a work in progress. We need to be very mindful of it so that benchmarks are fulfilling those good things they can and are intended to do, but we are not authorizing those things that can play a kind of mischievous havoc amongst the mission.

MR. KRISTOL: One more question. Yes?

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I have a question for the Congressman and woman.


Afghanistan and Pakistan are both Islamic republics. And I am just wondering if the Islamic nature of these countries figures into your strategies? If not, why not? If so, how?

CONGRESSMAN MC HUGH: I think it has to. I mean on the cultural level, if nothing else, as nearly a 17-year member of the Armed Services Committee, we have started to spend a get deal of time, appropriately so, as to culturally advising our troops from the lowest rank to the highest as to what the realities of that may be.

The second part, of course, is that when you talk about Islamic alignments, you have to refine it beyond that. You have got Sunni, Shiite, you have various subsects of both that have histories behind them. So we do have to be mindful of it.

But still at the end of the day, I think that the counterinsurgency policy that we can read in textbooks, while in need of adjustment to the realities on the ground wherever you are applying it, have to be the overriding consideration. In Pakistan you have got Islamic concerns against the majorities in India, et cetera, et cetera. So, we can never just shunt that aside. And I think we have to consider it fully as we go forward, but it cannot be militarily the overriding consideration, it seems to me.

CONGRESSWOMAN HARMAN: It is interesting how much we have learned since 9/11. I would say that the ignorance level of Congress while still high is less high by a lot than it was on 9/11. And that certainly includes my ignorance level.

There are lots of Muslim countries in the world, and we have to deal with many of them. I think you could say in both of these countries that the fact that they are Muslim countries is an opportunity. One of the ways in which al-Qaeda in particular has overplayed its hand is it has attacked ruthlessly Muslims.

Part of the change in Iraq, in addition to what we added with the surge, but part of the change was that al-Qaeda overplayed its hands with the Sunnies in Alhambra, and that turned a large number of the population against al-Qaeda. I think al-Qaeda and certainly Lashkar-e-Taiha is overplaying its hand in Pakistan right now. The attack yesterday is a perfect example of this.

And so there is the opportunity with a counterinsurgency strategy to work with Muslim leadership in these countries against, you know, this toxic piece of their own population.

So,I think we will be more successful and their countries will be stronger if we understand that that is what happening. That the moderate Muslim world -- and there is a moderate Muslim word -- is threatened in many countries by this extremist element, and that they have a huge role to play in defeating it. And that really is the subplot in Afghanistan. It is that this country has to win its own victory. And we have to help enable it to do that.

CONGRESSMAN MC HUGH: I agree.

MR. KRISTOL: Thank you very much, Jane and John. If all of our elected officials had your degree of seriousness and wisdom, we would be in slightly better shape than we are in, and I am heartened personally by this panel, and I know we all very much enjoyed it and appreciate your taking the time. Thank you very much.

(Applause.)

(Brief recess.)

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