Summary

Kagan began by asking Senator McCain how, if he had been elected president, his plan for Afghanistan would have differed from that of the Obama Administration.

McCain stressed the need to emphasize how difficult the mission in Afghanistan will be. There will be an initial, significant increase in casualties as we deploy more forces there, he explained. But the situation in Afghanistan is not as dire as it was in Iraq prior to the “surge.”

Assuming that the Administration may be planning to eventually provide more forces beyond the recently announced 21,000, McCain said that he would have announced the full increase up front, so as to avoid the appearance of “Lyndon Johnson-style incrementalism.” He also would have proposed a substantial expansion in the size of the Afghan National Army.

McCain went on to suggest that a year from now, the United States will be facing even greater opposition from enemies in Afghanistan. Asked whether Republicans could be expected to continue supporting the mission, McCain indicated that they would and argued that the most criticism would likely come from the left, where some have already begun to complain about the number of forces being sent to the country.

Asked about the Bush Administration’s handling of the Afghan conflict, McCain pointed to shortfalls in the command structures established in Afghanistan, the failure to sufficiently grow the Afghan National Army, and the inability to encourage more effective participation from our allies. Failure to properly resource the conflict, McCain argued, stemmed from the fact that once we had become committed in Iraq, it became critical that we succeed there, as failure would have compromised our success in Afghanistan and our interests elsewhere. This is one argument for increasing the size of the American Army and Marine Corps, McCain explained.

With regard to our allies, McCain suggested that the goodwill and enthusiasm generated in Europe by Obama could perhaps be leveraged into additional support for the Afghan mission—though not in the form of more troops. Rather than asking for more forces we are unlikely to get, McCain said we should encourage our allies to take the lead in the Afghan Army training efforts.

Having raised the issue of inadequate U.S. Army and Marine Corps force sizes in the Bush years, McCain went on to discuss the necessary defense spending priorities of the years ahead. Citing the evolution in the application of military technology even over the course of the Iraq war, McCain suggested that we need to carefully tailor acquisition to the threat environment, rather than pursue technology for technology’s sake. He believes that procurement reform is an absolute priority.

On the topic of Pakistan, McCain argued that the challenges emanating from the country represent a strategic threat, which calls for a strategy addressing Pakistan qua Pakistan—not simply the border regions. He said that the notion that you cannot succeed in Afghanistan without solving the border problems is incorrect. But the proposed plan for conditioning aid to the Pakistani Army based on measurable success in pursuing insurgents is problematic, he explained. Moving forward, we will need to communicate to the people of Pakistan that it is in their interest to see the United States and its allies succeed in Afghanistan.

Transcript

DR. KAGAN: We are now to the much anticipated part of this discussion on Afghanistan today. I hope you will all join me in welcoming Senator John McCain.

(Applause.)

SENATOR MC CAIN: Every place I go everybody comes up says I voted for you, I voted for you. I guess I should demand a recount.

(Laughter.)

SENATOR MC CAIN: Thank you for your kind offer.

DR. KAGAN: Thank you for very much for joining me today. I know it is a busy time for the Congress with all kinds hearings, but there is awful lot going on in the world, so we are grateful for the opportunity to talk to you about them. And the subject for the conference today, as you know, is Afghanistan, and we are all talking about the recent plans set forth by President Barack Obama.

If you missed the first two panels because you perhaps were not here, I just want you to know that there has been a love fest, it has been a bipartisan love fest the whole time we have been here. And I just want you to -- you know, if you want to break that up, you are welcome to.

But I guess -- I think the question probably a lot of people would want to know is, there was a lot of talk about Afghanistan during the campaign. You put forth a plan; Senator Obama put effort a plan. I wonder if you were in his shoes right now, how different would your plan look from the one he has set forth?

SENATOR MC CAIN: The foreign policy initiative is a great beginning, I know you had great panels and its now upon the senate for national security issues across our country. We are all full of great challenge.

And I mentioned that I was in Brussels at a conference over the weekend, and Bob did a particularly spectacular job of panel. He really did a good job. I support the plan that our panel  members mentioned earlier today. I probably would have done a few things differently.

One and most importantly emphasize -- and the President did, but I think he really has to emphasize how difficult this challenge is and that as with the surge that will be increasing to reassert control of that campaign. Including the challenge. So we will and can and must succeed, but it is not going to be easy.

But it may not be the end of our awakening as far as the overall strategy used to attract Taliban and other extremists to our side. It may not be. By the way, it is not as tough as Iraq. Don't let anybody tell you that it is, because when we started the surge Iraq was virtually in a state of collapse. You look at all of the parameters that judge how you are doing in a conflict Iraq was the tougher than this issue is, although it has its own setting.

The second thing I would have done, probably, is went ahead and announced the overall condition of our troops, rather then be accused of  a Lyndon Johnson instrumentalist because it is very clear what General McKiernan asked for, even though it may not be right away, I would have probably gone ahead and announced that we intend to do that.

And I guess third of all, I think it is very important that we continue to consult with Congress and with the leaders of both side to of the aisle to prevent a sort of a resurgence of an antiwar activity situation. I would have announced a dramatic increase in the Afghan army. I am talking about up to 200, 250,000 person army with a country population and we need the exercise of the army.

And those are just some of the areas that perhaps I would have emphasized differently. Overall I appreciate the president's strategy. I appreciate the fact that there is many of our military leaders who are the formulation of this strategy.

DR. KAGAN: I think -- I don't want to speak for the Obama Administration, although I  usually do.

(Laughter.)

DR. KAGAN: They probably would have said, look, we indeed have the economic crisis so the very over this thing with natural strong thing of course they didn't bite off maybe more than the American public and Congress can chew. I think that would be their -- that might be their argument.

I guess the question is how deep is the support in Congress in both analysis in both parties? There have been a little bit of a debate today as to whether there might be a weakening of support, casualties are going to go up inevitably if the economic crisis does not resolve itself in some way.

How thin or deep would you say the support is on both sides of the aisle?

SENATOR MC CAIN: I think that it is problematic as to what transpires. I think a year from now we are looking at a tougher fight than we are today. And it is hard for me to gauge, but I  do believe that there is a better understanding of the reasons why we are in Afghanistan. We have not forgotten 9/11; we have not forgotten the terrible abuses that the Taliban inflicted; and we are, I think, aware more of what is at stake here than perhaps we were in Iraq.

And General Petraeus as and our military leaders probably have been enhanced in their prestige on the part of the American people and members of Congress because of the success of the strategy in Iraq. But it is hard to know. But I don't think there is any doubt that a year from now we will be looking at a greater opposition -- level of opposition to the war than we are seeing today.

DR. KAGAN: There is some concern some Republicans will say, look, this is Obama's war now; he did this increase, we wash our hands of it. It would not be the first time a political party has done something like that.

SENATOR MC CAIN: I think that is possible, but I don't think it is very likely,  honestly, because I think the Republicans are very well aware, particularly that people like Dick Lugar and many others that are highly respected in the Republican party are supportive. I think it is more problematic with the Democratic leadership.

We all know the Speaker comes from a very liberal district. We know that Harry Reid has been very nervous about troop levels in Iraq as well as the strategy for Afghanistan. But I don't -- I guess what I worry most about is Americans have not been sufficiently alerted to the difficulties that we are going to face here.

DR. KAGAN: Do you have a certain amount of sympathy for the President? Do you agree with his assessment and many assessments that the President Bush Administration had seriously under resourced the effort in Afghanistan?

SENATOR MC CAIN: I think that the Bush Administration had under resourced for good and bad reasons. The good reason is because we simply were short of sufficient troops to do both Iraq  and Afghanistan, which argues, by the way, for a permanent and large increase in the army and marine corps.

This world is a long way from peaceful. And five years from now or two or three years from now, we may be looking at very different challenges, maybe in different parts of the world. I pray not, but I think we have to be prepared for that.

I think that we made mistakes in the command structure. I think we made mistakes in not, perhaps, being more -- more scrutiny of the Karzai government and some of the corruption that exists. I think we didn't put enough emphasis on expanding the Iraq -- Afghan army. So, I think that some responsibility can be borne by the Bush Administration.

DR. KAGAN: The President, as you know in his statement I think he must have mentioned -- he must have repeated about five times that the reason we have not done the right thing in Afghanistan was directly because of Iraq. You  seem to be in some agreement with that?

SENATOR MC CAIN: I'm in some agreement, but I also think that we probably could have or have reason to be disappointed in the lack of participation -- good participation on the part of our allies. We probably should have streamlined the command structure. We were disappointed by some of the commitments made for training police and judiciary that did not happen.

And so, I think that the Bush Administration bears some responsibility, but I think it is also time for us to look forward.

I would also argue that if we had retreated in defeat from Iraq, the challenge in Afghanistan would be immensely magnified. It was vital that we succeed in Iraq, once we were in there. We can argue whether we should have gone in, I will be glad to have that debate and discussion, but if we had failed and had withdrawn as, say, a large number of, quote, experts said that they want us to do, the challenge in Afghanistan would have been vastly magnified.

DR. KAGAN: You raise the issue of our allies, and you were just in Brussels listening to some of our allies talk about these issues. Obviously, Secretary Hillary Clinton is now in The Hague talking to allies about their contribution. What do you expect from our allies, and do you think they are going to meet your expectations in terms of assisting in Afghanistan?

SENATOR MC CAIN: I think it is important that President Obama has an enormous reservoir of goodwill in Europe. I think you will see that manifested by the people's enthusiasm for his first visit as President of the United States. I think he can translate that goodwill into larger commitments on the part of our allies.

I have to be very honest with you, though, I think that additional troops provided by our allies is not very likely, and certainly not in any significant number. When we were in Brussels, I met with the Canadian defense minister. Four Canadian soldiers had been gravely wounded that day. That has a tremendous effect on  public opinion in a small country, and Canada is a small country. And we are very grateful for what they have done.

But I think that rather than, perhaps, asking for things that we are not going to get, like troop increases, we ought to ask for those things, including the reserve fund, to train and equip a dramatically increased Afghanistan army, including training of police and the judiciary.

We all know the police are corrupt in Afghanistan. Everybody knows that. And it is an integral part of any successful strategy to have a police that is effective and respected.

So, I think there is a lot of areas where they can and will be of assistant to us. And I think the President will probably succeed, perhaps beyond some of our expectations, at least I hope so.

DR. KAGAN: Do you worry that there could be, as some people have raised today, including myself, that there could be a backlash brewing in the United States if it is perceived  that as America ramps up its military commitment to Afghanistan, the ratio of American to European forces really rises fairly dramatically? Will there be some resentment in the United States that American is carrying too heavy a load compared to its allies?

SENATOR MC CAIN: Throughout the Cold War all the way back as far as I can remember, there have been complaints about the United States having to bear the majority of the burden. That is unfortunately and in some way fortunately the obligations that go with being the world superpower. And I regret that we don't get more help from our allies. I regretted it during the entire Cold World. And I have regretted it -- but those are realities associated with the participation or lack of by our allies.

Our allies have intentionally reduced their defense spending to a level that makes them far more focused on diplomacy than on the use of military force. That is just a reality that we have to deal with. At the same time, I'm very  grateful for the British, I am very grateful for the Canadians, I am very grateful for many of our allies who have made significant contribution. And maybe we are not grateful enough from time to time as we should be.

DR. KAGAN: You also mentioned about --

SENATOR MC CAIN: Let me mention one other thing if I could real quick. If our allies and nations in the region know that we are there until we succeed, then I think that has an impact on their willingness or lack of willingness to participate as well.

This business of always, we have got to have an exit strategy, we have to have an exit strategy, we have got to have a date certain. My friends, the date certain comes sooner when we have convinced both our enemies and our friends that we will succeed, that we will not allow Afghanistan to evolve into a base for terrorist attacks on the United States of America and a place of chaos and disintegration. That is the quickest way to victory.

DR. KAGAN: You raised the question of the problem of insufficient just overall military capability during the Bush years when we were engaged in both Iraq and Afghanistan. What about now? It seems to me the pressure in Congress on both sides of the aisle is to reduce the defense budget, and so, I don't understand how we can square that with an increase commitment in the Afghanistan and a continuing commitment in Iraq.

SENATOR MC CAIN: I think it is very tough to square the present budget proposal with the size of the military, our commitment in Afghanistan and our gradual withdrawal from Iraq. I think it is an unrealistic assessment, particularly, again, looking at the situation in world.

I do not predict any kind of conflict with China, but it should disturb us a bit when a U.S. Navy ship in international waters is surrounded by Chinese -- I don't know what you want to call them -- vessels. So there is tensions that can only be addressed, I think, both  through good diplomacy and furthering good relations, but also a military capability that is one which serves as a deterrence to adventurism and misbehavior in any part of the world.

DR. KAGAN: As you are suggesting, there is always a tradeoff between current capabilities to deal with the conflicts that we are currently in and facing potential problems that are maybe 10 or 20 years down the road. I think under Rumsfeld there was a great prejudice in favor of worrying about the 20 years down road and perhaps under resourcing the immediate conflicts.

I wonder whether we are now in the midst of a shift toward focusing on the immediate conflicts and maybe killing -- and I think this is an issue that you have talked about -- killing some weapons programs that really are looking forward to conflicts that we have not even thought about having yet?

SENATOR MC CAIN: Could I mention also that we look back and we want to place blame and responsibility, and a certainly amount of that is  appropriate so that we don't repeat the mistakes. But I would argue that we, to some degree, squandered the, quote, peace dividend during the 1990s after the fall of the Berlin Wall and our expectation that we were at the end of history.

And back to the budget for one second here. I don't see how you could have a reduction and still acquire some of the weapons systems we need to. Classic example of our forward thinking and yet mistakes at the same time is a futures combat systems.

The army's proposal, which is now up, I believe, to $130 billion, and we still have not got the first operational aspect of it, which was going to provide us with our equipment for future conflicts and actually it is stalled out. You could make that same argument about other weapons systems, including the Joint Strike Fighter.

So we are going to have to regain some of the balance between affordable and doable weapons systems, but at the same time not have the kinds of cost overruns. Defense procurement  reform, which I share priority with the President, is an absolute requirement.

Finally, could I just give you a practical example. I was talking about it with General Petraeus yesterday. The first and second battles of Fallujah were not very much different than the battle of old. We had marines go in, an army go in, house-to-house fighting, people shooting from the rooftops, having to blow up houses, et cetera, and we paid a very heavy price in both the second battles of Fallujah.

Look at the battle of Sauder City, get a briefing on the battle of Sauder City. We were able to use technology to an incredible degree to, as General Petraeus put it, make our enemies take a knee, because we punished them every time their heads popped up. Every time they tried to fire a rocket, every time they tried to assassinate somebody, our surveillance and intelligence capabilities, ranking from the most rudimentary where people were informing on a person-to-person basis, to the best kind of high technology which  would track them whenever they went and hunt them down.

So there is a great virtue in technology advances in warfare, but you have got to match the technology to the challenge, rather than just the technology for the technology sake. I know that that is a bit of a complicated answer, but that is the challenge of combating future enemies is having technology match the threat, rather than technology for technology sake.

DR. KAGAN: Let's move from Afghanistan to Pakistan, which the whole thing is called Af-Pak, I am told. And the premise of Af-Pak is that there is no solving Afghanistan without solving Pakistan or there is no solving Pakistan without solving Afghanistan or one of those. But what is your view of Pakistan?

That did also come up during the campaign. Now we have a situation where people think that things are getting worse in Pakistan, we have expanding drone attacks. What are your thoughts about Pakistan and the way -- well, not  only the way the Administration is handling it, but the way anybody would have to handle it?

SENATOR MC CAIN: I think the attack on the police academy yesterday was an indicator that the extremists have a significant capability. The attack in Mumbai was an incredibly sophisticated operation, and it didn't get more attention in the United States because it didn't happen in the United States.

But when you look at that attack and the way they orchestrated, ten people were able to virtually paralyze that city for, I think, about 24 or 36 hours. I have forgotten. And this attack yesterday on a police academy is another example of people that are willing to die but not as suicide bombers, they want to take a whole lot of people with them before they go. That is a shift in tactics and strategy on the part of terrorists and one that we are going to have to learn to cope with.

I believe that Pakistan by itself is a vital nation -- security interest to the United  States of America. They are a nuclear armed country; they have a very large population; their geographic situation, all of it argues for a Pakistan strategy for Pakistan alone.

Now, is Pakistan important and very important as far as our ability to succeed in Afghanistan? Yes. But this notion that you cannot succeed in Afghanistan without a success in Pakistan, to a large degree, I don't subscribe to.

We were able to succeed in Iraq with Iranians sending in the most lethal IEDs, the Syrians being a transhipment point for suicide bombers, and we never had to fight the Iranians. And we obviously, by our success is exactly what reduced the activities from both Iran and to a large degree, eliminated to some degree from Syria.

So we can succeed. It would be a lot harder and a lot tougher, but we need a strategy that involves both countries, but we also need a separate strategy as regards to Pakistan by itself. And I don't have to tell anybody in this  room the political turmoil and the problems with the ISI all of those. But the fact is that Pakistan still does have an elected government and a stumbling but functioning democracy. And I don't see signs that the military wants to take over Pakistan again for good reasons and practical reasons.

DR. KAGAN: What about the idea of conditioning aide to the military and to Pakistan on the basis of their performance?

SENATOR MC CAIN: I am always nervous about that, because if you point a gun at somebody, you better be prepared to pull the trigger. I think Kahani is a good leader. I worry, and we all continue to worry about the penetration of the ISI and the interlocking relationship between the military and the ISI as well. But I think we ought to do everything we can to further democracy, I think encourage stability, encourage cooperation.

I would like for us to go up -- not cross the line between persuasion and threats of  withdrawing our assistance and our involvement with Pakistan, because I don't think we can -- I don't think we could do that. At the same time a careful balance of persuasion and showing the Pakistan government and people that it is in their interest for us to succeed in Afghanistan and in the border areas and now in other parts of Pakistan as well.

And I think we can do that because every election that is held in Pakistan extremists are rejected that are on the ballot. It is not that they have this large base of popular support. They don't, even in the areas where the Taliban and other extremist organizations have control.

So, it is not as if we are facing a Pakistani public opinion that is anything but in pursuit of the same goals that we share.

DR. KAGAN: Those that have made the argument that the drone attacks themselves undermine Pakistani support for American objectives, what is your view on that?

SENATOR MC CAIN: My view is that it is  probably -- and I'm glad I'm not part of the Administration -- it is probably a wise thing to do, particularly when we can specifically identify these people. And it is part of an overall strategy, but it is only a part.

I remind you that we what we had 120,000 troops in Iraq, and every night and even every day we were going out and we were killing off bad people and their leadership. And everybody would say, boy, that is great, we killed off the local al-Qaeda or whichever group it was leadership, whoever it was. And yet we were losing. We were losing even though we were able to, through intelligence and our drones, et cetera, kill off some of these people.

So, it cannot be the only strategy is what I'm saying. I think it should probably be done, but don't think it is the strategy that they will achieve success.

DR. KAGAN: I will ask just one final question then open it up to the audience. We are now engaged in a lot of discussions with a lot of  regional players, we have a regional approach. If you go around the periphery of Afghanistan and look at some of the major powers there, who wants to be helpful and who doesn't want to be helpful? If you look at Russia, Iran, Pakistan and some of the others, do you think that they all want to try -- India, do they all want to try to be helpful in Afghanistan?

SENATOR MC CAIN: I think some of them are very ambivalent, and let's talk about Iran, for example. I don't think the Iranians want the Taliban to take over Afghanistan. At the same time, they obviously take great pleasure in seeing us in difficulties there. So I think they are kind of ambivalent about it, very unlike their approach to Iraq.

The Russians, again, there is a bit of pragmatism there with the Russians, but they have had their problems with Islamic extremists and they certainly would not, I don't think, like to see a Taliban dominated government.

I think they, in the case of Pakistan,  their economic difficulties which are deep and severe right now, are exacerbating all of their problems. And that is why I support this aid and assistance -- economic aid and assistance to Pakistan right now. And with the precondition that much of that money will be wasted -- I'm sorry -- and we will do everything we can to have it accounted for and everything, but there will be stories on the front page of newspapers about some of the corruption and some of the problems that are associated with it.

So India is very interesting, in my view, because there is a view in Pakistan that the Indians are taking control of the economy and forging close alliances with Afghanistan. I don't think that is true. But there is that belief and part of it is based on this deep-seated animosity that exists between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Which reminds me that still if you ask the majority of the Pakistani people and military, they would probably say that the greater threat to their security is still India as opposed to  Afghanistan, which then makes it understandable some of their lack of movement of troops, lack of efforts, significant efforts to a reassert control in certain parts of the border areas.

So the relations with Afghan's neighbors are complex but I think that if we begin to succeed in Afghanistan and restore control and then all of the things that follow that, then I think their neighbors will behave in a more responsible fashion.

DR. KAGAN: Thank you. I probably have hogged up too much time. We have time for one or two questions, and two if the first one is brief.

Yes, sir.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I have a question about Afghanistan's government. How should we encourage the Karzai Administration or another successor if he is booted out in August, to be more effective, to be less corrupt and to generally improve their the country? What are your thoughts?

SENATOR MC CAIN: I think we all know  that right now, anyway, there is not a viable opponent or strong opponent to President Karzai. Now, one may emerge. There is certainly great dissatisfaction in parts of Afghanistan towards the government, and we all know about the corruption situation.

So, I don't envision a scenario right now where President Karzai would be defeated. A lot of things happen in politics.

But if he were, then I think we would obviously forge -- try to forge a new and productive relationship.

I would like to remind you that -- again, going back to the one of my former experiences, if you look at Vietnam, the assassination of Diem was a seminal moment. And it meant really a lack of support for the government, a lack of an effective government. We had a revolving door of generals running Saigon.

So we want to be careful about how we approach the Karzai situation and certainly not, in my view, interfere in what is really a domestic  election in Afghanistan.

DR. KAGAN: Yes, sir?

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Senator, do you believe that the heart and the brains of our adversaries are in Pakistan not in Afghanistan?

SENATOR MC CAIN: I think the heart and brains of our adversaries are literally all over the world. I think that they are Islamic extremists that have a goal of imposing their will and their brand of the Koran which is not in keeping with, obviously, the majority of people of Muslim faith, obviously. And that they view Afghanistan as a place where that could further those aims and goals.

Their goals are not just confined to Afghanistan. They are confined to taking on with a view as the enemy and that is the people and governments and countries of the rest of the world. But I believe a lot of the talent probably is residing in parts of Pakistan right now.

DR. KAGAN: Thank you, Senator. Once again, you have shown that you are a pillar of  wisdom and clarity in a world that needs a lot of that, and we are very grateful for the time that you have spent with us today.

(Applause.)