MR. FLY: For those of you who are just joining us this evening, this is the final session of the day as part of the Foreign Policy Initiative's conference, Advancing and Defending Democracy. My name is Jamie Fly, I'm the Executive Director of the Foreign Policy Initiative.

Some of you have been with us for a long of day of the panels, so I'm happy that you stayed on. This session is called Voices of Freedom: A Conversation with Dissidents, and it's going to be moderated by Jeff Gedmin, President of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.

Jeff has been at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty since early 2007. Before assuming that role, he was director of the Aspen Institute in Berlin, and prior to joining Aspen, he was Executive Director of the New Atlantic Initiative of the American Enterprise Institute.

We're very excited that Jeff was able to join us this evening, and I'm going to turn it over to him to introduce the panelists and get us going.

MR. GEDMIN: Well, Jamie, thank you very much, and warmest thanks for Foreign Policy Initiative. Welcome to everybody here at the W Hotel in Washington, and welcome to C-SPAN audiences.

We have a terrific program, titled a conversation -- Voices of Freedom: A Conversation with Dissidents. And we have two leaders from two leading countries.

First, to my left, Saad Eddin Ibrahim, who is a sociologist, a writer, a scholar, currently affiliated with Drew University, last year I think with Harvard University, and is not only in Egypt the leading, I would say, voice on behalf of a liberal order, order of pluralism, of tolerance, of respect for diversity, but because of his writing and because of his intellectual heft, well known for exactly this kind of work and advocacy throughout the Middle East. So Saad, welcome to you, and we look forward to hearing from you in just a few moments.

MR. IBRAHIM: Thank you.

MR. GEDMIN: And then to my right, Ali Afshari, who similarly has a distinguished career in writing, also in political activism and advocacy. Both our colleagues tonight have spent time in the West, in their home countries -- I'm sorry to say -- in prison. Both of you, arrested for values that you care deeply about and that you fight for.

Ali has been involved in political campaigning, including for then President Khatami of Iran, among student groups, in particular, and is an eloquent voice and spokesman for the reform minded cause of the liberal reform in Iran. So Ali, welcome to you, we're delighted to have you.

It seems to me that there are a number of things that we'll want to talk about, but I'd like to start, Saad, with you, if I may. It seems to me that one thing that Washington -- we in Washington -- are guilty of is always looking to the past for a model for the present and future.

And if you read the op-ed pages in the United States, and you go to think tanks and meet with people in various agencies of government, they will often say, well, we've done this before; we know how to help and support dissidents, we know how to promote democracy because we did it during the Cold War.

Well, we did, and it seems to me there must be lessons we can learn, but also seems to me that there must be differences. After all, we're talking about -- at least in this panel, principally -- about the greater Middle East and countries with Muslim majorities in a different time, with different media.

Could you talk to us a little bit about what the differences are and how you engage Western and American policymakers on what history tells us and what's different now?

MR. IBRAHIM: Well, the cause is the same. Fighting for democracy and freedom and defense of human rights is a common cause in the Middle East as it was in Eastern and Central Europe, as it is anywhere else in the world.

But the way to help dissidents has to do particularized, has to be country-based cases, because you have, for example, on this panel two major countries in the Middle East. Both of them are very important, pivotal countries, as I say. But the relationship with the U.S. is different.

In the case of Egypt, it is a friendly dictatorship, friendly authoritative dictatorship, friendly with the U.S. as a government, but not with the U.S. as a people. In the case of Iran -- and of course my colleague can speak about -- at least the way it looks is that it is with a hostile regime.

And therefore while the case in Iran is probably more clear-cut, in the case of Egypt it is more nuanced and confused.

MR. GEDMIN: Well, maybe we can start there with Egypt for a moment, and then we'll come over to you, Ali, about Iran and the neighboring countries.

What do you say to people in West European capitals and the United States who say, listen, Saad Ibrahim, we believe in freedom and democracy and we support you, we're sympathetic to your cause, but we have other equities: we care about the peace process, we care about stability, we care about fighting terrorism. We think that what is in place in Egypt is autocratic, but maybe it's the best deal we can get right now, maybe it's realistic. What do you say to people like that?

MR. IBRAHIM: Well, I'd say that we have -- you have tried these autocratic regimes, in the case of Egypt for the last 28 years -- and what have you gotten out of it? Nothing. Nothing in the peace process. Not one inch beyond what the late President Sadat accomplished. Not one iota. And yet the regime is using its role in the peace process to keep the pressure off.

Number two, the regime has skillfully recognized that there is, what they would say, pathological fear of Islamist. So it uses the incident of a good showing by Hamas in Palestine or the Muslim Brotherhood somewhere else in the Middle East to frighten you.

And instead of being frightened, you should have spoken to the true democrats, who stand exactly in between the autocrats, the likes of the Mubarak regime, and the theocrats, the likes of let's say the mullahs in Iran -- I don't want to speak on behalf of Ali -- or the Taliban in Afghanistan.

So between, in the public space, between the autocrats and the theocrats, there is a budding force.

And that budding force is the democrats.

MR. GEDMIN: And how would you recommend one -- in the case of Egypt specifically, how does one support them? Do they need material support? Do they need money? Do they need rhetorical support? Should it come from the bully pulpit of the President of the United States? What kind of support is productive? What kind of support could be counterproductive?

MR. IBRAHIM: All of the above, but ask the dissident, ask the democratic activist of what they need. I cannot speak on all -- on behalf of all of them. I can speak myself, I need moral support, first of all. I would demand that the American administration, whether it's a Republican or a Democratic administration, use creative conditionality with an autocratic regime, because it's a friendly regime, and say, well, you are friendly, but this is our values, and we stand by it, and we have a constituency in our own country in the U.S. that demands that our friends should observe the minimum standards of human rights and of democracy.

And you have done that with the Soviet block before. You have done after -- with Helsinki in 1975. When the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc needed food, trade, aid, technology, you said yes. The Warsaw -- sorry, the NATO countries told the Warsaw countries at the time, we will advance all of the above if you open up your public space. And when they did and they signed on the dotted line, that was a beginning of the dismantling of both authoritarianism, totalitarianism in Eastern and Central --

We demand something like that. It doesn't have to be exactly, but the spirit of this creative kind of conditionality should be put in place.

MR. GEDMIN: To try to articulate some set of standards and have some measure of accountability.

MR. IBRAHIM: Absolutely.

MR. GEDMIN: Ali, over to you. let me pick up from one thing, one think that Saad said which puzzles me or maybe bewilders me -- it makes sense, but I find it difficult -- and that was Saad's point, if you want to help support the work of dissidents from these kinds of countries, listen to them and listen to what they do want.

Now as you know, as President of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, we broadcast to Iran. We are not permitted by that regime to have a bureau inside the country, so out of Prague, where our headquarters sits, we have 40 distinguished Iranian colleagues.

I ask them frequently, what should the United States do, what should Western policymakers do, what is the right set of policies or the right formula to support the democratically minded opposition movement?

But the problem is -- you know what the problem is going to be -- we've got people as young as 25 and old as 75. Some came out of the country this year, some came out 30 years ago. Some were social democrats, some were green, some were Christian democrats. Some want a parliamentary democracy, some want a presidential democracy, some want a monarchy.

They all want decent, accountable government, but, Saad, when I ask them -- that very diverse, very complex group of people, who want democracy in some way -- what should we do, how do we support you, we get very different reactions. How does -- it's understandable that we're not dealing with monoliths, but how does one puzzle through that sort of thing?

MR. AFSHARI: Right, good questions. Let me, too, look at the recent struggle in Iran. If you see and followed that struggle, it's not ideology struggle, and all different peoples, different generations, different ideology, different cultural view, they come together and they just want freedom, better life and human rights in Iran.

And there is a consensus about that. The problem that you mention on that, it's more among the diaspora, outside of Iran. But also recently there is advancement, and a better situation on that.

If you see there are some protests that have been held -- out of Iran, in U.S. and Europe -- and you can see the more people with different ideas. But in Iran, I give it to you, it's a special case in Iran, and it's not -- you cannot -- the similar case in the world or in the Muslim countries. It's a different case.

But I think that right now the Radio Farda, Liberty, and also Voice of America, they are successful because right now they have more audience inside Iran. And they're effective in this, up here in the -- also in recent protests, and they can't -- broke the isolation policy that the government wants to impose on that.

But if I want to ask -- answer to your questions, right now I cannot talk about the whole parts of the Iranian dissidents, because it's very divisive and different ideas. But there is a general consensus that support human rights and peoples demands in Iran, because right now in Obama's administration, there is a change from the past administration.

I agree, the militaristic approach was unsuccessful on the last administration, but the current administration, I believe that the current policy that they don't mention to human rights and they just want to follow -- deal with the Iranian regime about the nuclear issues and stability or security issues, I think similarity it goes in the wrong direction.

And first, in this -- right now, it needs to focus on the human rights issue as the one agenda that is not negotiable, with the Iranian regime as a part of the package, and I believe that to condition on negotiation with the regime.

And then I believe that the continue to some project like the -- giving grants, there are some Iranian democratic initiatives and also supporting the Voice of America, Radio Farda and some media like that, because the situation in Iran has become worse after the post-election. Right now there is more crackdown against the democratic activists.

MR. GEDMIN: Well, Ali, take the one point, about how -- Saad just spoke about how the support depends on what individuals articulate as their needs, but one thing one frequently hears about Iranian oppositionists is that if they get too much help from the West or the wrong sort of help from the West, they're tainted; it's manipulated by the regime; it's not productive, it's counterproductive. Is that true, or are there guidelines or limits that you would advise people in Washington, for example?

MR. AFSHARI: No, I don't believe that, because the regime always uses that. For example, if you follow the policy of the regime, since 30 years ago, every time a regime sentences -- a regime condemn the opposition as agent of the U.S.

For example, if you see the -- Mr. Mousavi, he has a very left agenda and he has no affiliation with any positive approach to the U.S. But right now regime condemn him as an agent of the U.S. and follows the velvet revolution in Iran.

I believe that's not true, and it depends how U.S. frame their policy against Iranian regime. I believe the support, it's useful, because if you see the behavior of the regime, they fear about that, and every time they mention on that.

For example, the hard-liner media several times in weeks ago, they mention that there is possibility that we have a negotiation between Ahmadinejad and Obama in the U.N. Assembly gathering. That's the sign that the regime does not want to -- there is a relation between the U.S. and also opposition in Iran.

MR. GEDMIN: In the case of Iran right now, Ali, is -- we all agree that it's not one size fits all and each case and each time has its own particulars. In the case of Iran right now, would you advise the United States to be bold and strong rhetorically in a public manner, or would you recommend a quieter approach with back channels and reliance on the Europeans to do certain things? What do you recommend to the White House right now?

MR. AFSHARI: I recommend the quieter -- cooperation -- the Europe, that's the better situation. But if they have support and agree with the U.S. approach, but I believe the tough diplomacy and strong position against Iranian regime, because Iranian regime is authoritarian regime, and it's behavior -- it's flexible when it feels more stronger pressure exists against it.

If you show silent and weaker, they come -- they want more and ask more. And right now I believe that if you see what Ahmadinejad say, right there -- Khamenei is a powerful man in the power circle says they do not in current situation -- they don't want to compromise in the nuclear issues and they want to continue on that.

And as several times Khamenei has told, he needs to have hostile relationship with America and he wants to become the hero of fundamentalist Muslims in the region.

MR. GEDMIN: You mentioned the nuclear issue. I want to ask you the same question I asked Saad at the top of the program. What about the person in Paris, London or Washington who says, listen, Ali, we care about human rights, but we have a nuclear issue to deal with, and anything that interferes or pushes that aside or draws attention away from that we're making a mistake; we like that, we want democracy in Iran, we don't think it's happening soon, right now, today, we have to solve the nuclear issue. How do you answer them?

MR. AFSHARI: I believe that it remains true in short term, the nuclear issue that's more than just for West. But I believe that a democracy, if Iranian people found, because right now Iranians amongst the Middle East peoples has more positive approach to U.S. -- if they find that the U.S. does not care about their situation, the democracy in Iran, it may be a turn and a point, and they change their mind, and support the hostile approach, the anti-American approach that has -- we had in contemporary history that approach.

And I believe in long term the U.S. damage from this approach, and also I believe that because Iran already has nuclear -- uranium enrichment ability, and I don't believe that anybody can stop that, because it's software and -- if even you bomb that, this or that, they can easily refurnish on that and build again that ability.

Also I believe that if Iran has a democratic and rational government, nuclear issues, that's not the case. And as Israel has in the region and Pakistan also has in region the nuclear issues, I understand the problem will not work.

MR. GEDMIN: Saad, let me go back to you for a moment. You talked about -- I think you call it the pathological fear that some of us have in the West of extremism and Islamists in some of the countries of the Middle East.

First question is, you would probably concede that there's legitimate fear, however -- maybe pathological is inappropriate but legitimate is appropriate.

And second, related to that, in a country like yours, you are inspiring and convincing, but why should people in the West believe that there's a large constituency in Egypt of people like you? Could we be deceived, not by you deceiving us, but we're hearing what we want to hear. You're a liberal, you care about liberal values, but is there a large constituency for that in today's Egypt?

MR. IBRAHIM: Jeff, let me give you figures, facts and figures. In the last election in Egypt, fraudulent as it may have been -- this was in 2005 -- only 23 percent of the registered voters voted. And this is a government figures, 23 percent. Where are the other 77 percent? They abstained.

These are registered voters. These are middle class. And why did they abstain? Because they did not like either alternative. There was an autocratic regime that has been in power by that time nearly 25 years, corrupt, inept. And then there was an alternative, the Muslim Brotherhood, organized, solid, coherent, but they have a vision that the majority does not like.

And therefore, as we learned from Professor Lipset, whose wife is with us here, when voters are under cross pressure, they abstain. When there are two competing things or two undesirable alternatives, then choose between the undesirables, you cannot do that, you stay home.

And that is a constituency that the democrats like myself are counting on. That's the constituency that another liberal who will be here in the States in less than two months, Ayman Nour, al Ghad party, the party of the future, are tapping.

And it is that constituency that we like Western democracies to keep propping, encouraging. And one way of encouraging, to withhold your support from the dictators in the region. Even if they pose as friendly, but I don't think a dictator can ever be friendly to a democracy, a genuine democracy.

So he may be expedient, opportunist, but don't believe that he is really friendly. He is there for himself.

MR. GEDMIN: That sounds convincing as well, but it seems to me that the United States is confronted with the reality of, at times, forging tactical relationships. I don't think anybody in this room -- I may be wrong -- but democrats though that we all are, and supporters of democracy, support instantly breaking bilateral relations with Saudi Arabia and isolating or undermining the regime.

Every analogy, Saad, is imperfect, and this is certainly a limping analogy, but what if someone said to you, we're for what you want and we want to support it, but we don't want to destabilize this government; we don't want to revisit the Iran experience where we get rid of one autocratic regime -- in that case, 1979, the Shah, and well-intentioned as the motive was, it was a disaster and we got something even worse. What do you say to a critic like that?

MR. IBRAHIM: I'd say that we have beside a negative experience like Iran, we have about hundred positive experience worldwide. From the time of the Portuguese uprising against dictatorship back in 1974 until today, there has been a hundred countries, like Egypt, like Iran, who have made the transition. And only one or two made the wrong transition.

And therefore, do not use that -- the exception, exceptional cases, exceptional negative cases to punish all the potential positive cases. And we have even countries in which Islamists ran for office and it wasn't the end of the world. They are very responsible in Kuwait, in Jordan, in Turkey -- one of your oldest allies in the Middle East, Turkey, since the mid-'40s, has been very close allies.

Well, the Islamists see justice and development party, which is in the Islamist party, has run for election, and has respected the rules of the game. So as a calling for conditional -- creative conditionality with the regimes, I say, Western democracies should have similar creative conditionality with even social movements and other political parties in that part of the world, in the Middle East, that you will not recognize them, you will not deal with them if they do not respect the rules of the game.

And you always have the card, and believe me, everybody wants to be recognized by the United States, even those who have been professional at bashing the United States right and left, yet they want to be recognized by the United States. They realize that their legitimacy is contingent on being recognized by Western democracies. And that is not to be belittled. This is a very important card, not to mention other incentives that you can give.

MR. GEDMIN: Thank you. Let me ask Ali one more question, then we'll open up to the audience for questions and comments. Ali, say a word about what is making Iranian voters tick right now.

I met with an Iranian who had come right out of Tehran about 10 days ago in Europe, and this gentleman is from the capital, from Tehran. He is a -- comes from science, hard science. He described himself as previously apolitical, not terribly involved in any particular cause or campaign, and he told me that he, his family, his friends, his colleagues are now highly motivated politically. He told me that the regime had gone too far, lied too much, and crossed red lines, and he would never accept this government again.

That's one individual, an educated individual who had come out briefly to Europe. Is that representative? What could you tell us through your alliances, your networks, your source of information about what is making Iranians tick right now, a couple months after the elections this summer?

MR. AFSHARI: Interesting issues that -- I would like to talk about that. Right now the situation is different than before the election. Before the election, people want to walk because they want to just -- Ahmadinejad. But after the election and what's happened in Iran's political sphere, they changed to some semi-revolutionary situation. People want to -- more radical change inside the political structure.

And what -- you told about the gentleman that recently came out of Iran. It's true, because the -- it's very interesting that in the new part of the society, especially among the youth generation, that they didn't have any interest of politics in recent years. Then politicized during this green movement, and they are the new army of democracy in Iran. And as the reports really, in Tehran, showed that the movement is alive, and all efforts of the regime to -- killing people, to harassing them, to forcing them to force confession, to raping -- all that efforts has not been successful and cannot stop people to continue the struggles.

And I believe that the regime, and especially Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, they lost totally their legitimacy inside the society, and they just control of the intelligence service, military, especially the Revolutionary Guards, what's the factors for survive. But definitely it cannot work for the long-term.

And also another interesting issue is the gap between the clergy and the government in the votes, because in Shia's custom, high clergy should see by his eye or by eye of his agents the moon to declare the Fitr Eid, Eid Fitr, but just Khomeini announce the Sunday as the Fitr Eid, but the other in the high clergy, all of them announced Monday would be Eid Fitr. And it shows that -- the gap between the clergy and the government.

MR. GEDMIN: And there are presumably gaps within the clergy, too, now, rather significant divisions.

MR. AFSHARI: Exactly, divisions, and they no longer support the regime, especially Khomeini's approach. And they believe that it should be -- he should be changed or he should be change his policy and his mind.

And I believe for that reason regime is not as strong as before, and there is much more possibility for a change in Iran.

MR. GEDMIN: That's an exciting prospect. I think with that, Ali, thank you, and Saad, I think we should turn it over to our audience and invite our distinguished gusts to ask questions. And if you would please identify yourself.

QUESTION: Abe Greenwald of the Foreign Policy Initiative. I have a question for Mr. Afshari. The regime in Iran says that they're cracking down in order to preserve the principles of the revolution. Similarly, or in a mirror image, the reformers are often found talking about preserving the true spirit of the revolution. They chanted -- continue to chant Allahu Akbar.

What's your sense -- is there a significant portion of the reform movement outside the framework of the revolution?

MR. AFSHARI: Good questions. The green movement comes of two levels. First level is the challenge between section of the regime, section of the true revolutionary principles. That's, for example, Mr. Mousavi and Khomeini is the symbol of this gap between those groups.

But also there is a struggle between the civil society forces and the Iranian people, and it's they just want democracy and better life. At this moment they accept it as a first step, then the leadership of Mousavi or the reformist part, because they show -- has not given up what the government and continue to struggle to them and provided opportunity for people to choose what they want in that process.

But on the future, I believe that more chance is for the agenda of this outside of the frame of the regime. Maybe if they inspire by some part of the revolutionary principles, but they just leave the secular democracy in Iran. And I believe that Mr. Mousavi or Mr. Karobi, they don't have so much time to continue -- to keep their leadership in the situation.

In next couple of months, if they cannot succeed in this process, it will be happen in new wave of some revolutionary situation in Iran will be happened. And probably we will have the same experience like the constitutional movement 100 years ago in Iranian history, also like the Islamic revolution is a kind of the velvet revolution. That's most capable for the situation of Iran.

MR. GEDMIN: Thank you. Let's take another question.

QUESTION: This is a question for Dr. Saad.

Why do you think there is a kind of great -- seemingly great reluctance on the part of Americans to really support the liberal, pro-Western forces in the Middle East? And do you think that this counter-narrative that Americans usually give, which is stability versus change, is it an excuse or they really believe that?

MR. IBRAHIM: Well, I think that question probably should be directed toward American policymaker, but if I may take a crack at it. I think it is basically an excuse. The bureaucracy here likes to deal with the bureaucracy there, and they want to maintain the status quo.

And when I say "the bureaucracy," I mean State Department, American Embassy in Cairo and other capitals, the army, the Pentagon. And speaking in all -- when we were in Prague three years ago, at the end of -- three years ago, 2007, President Bush surprised the meeting by declaring himself -- this was a meeting of democratic forces both in Eastern Europe and in the third world -- and he said, I'm a dissident like you, so conversation was, dissident? And everybody cracked, everybody laughed, as you are laughing now.

He said, oh, I mean it, I am a dissident in Washington. Do you see anybody from the State Department with me? Do you see anybody from the Pentagon with me? And he kept counting different institutions in the U.S. who -- according to him -- are undermining his freedom agenda. And he said, but I still have 18 months -- at the time it was 18 months, this was June 2007 -- and I'm going to keep trying.

What I'm really trying to say is that the bureaucracies in the U.S., as everywhere else, seem to outlive elected leaders. And unless you really overhaul the bureaucracy to serve a given policy, then the tendency is to go just that.

So every excuse is used, and they mentioned some of the excuses. One is the peace process, and I said, this is nonsense, and if they think that Mubarak will deliver anything -- we have a saying in Arabic, this is like the devil aspiring to go to heaven. It will not happen.

And if they think that Mubarak will deliver, he did not deliver, and you probably noted when he was here two months ago -- he kept saying I have two more years, give me a chance, I have two more years. If he had not delivered in 28 years, you wonder, what would make him immediately deliver in two -- I hope he's right, I hope he will deliver. Maybe he had something up his sleeve. But I keep saying, this is like the devil's aspiration to go to heaven.

The other thing that's often -- already noted, is that fear of the Islamists, something that even as a secularist myself, I do not share. And because I know that if a fair and free election is conducted in Egypt today, according to our straw polling was in the last election and other elections, the maximum they will get is 30 percent. And if they get 30 percent they should be entitled to 30 percent of the seats in parliament.

But it is not the majority and they would not be able to vote. That is my stand, but in order to convince the establishment in Western democracies of all the above, it is taking me a lot of time and it is an uphill fight. So I hope everybody here in this audience will at least debate these issues and put it on the agenda. And as I said, whatever you are afraid of, put it on the agenda.

Which takes me to one of the questions that Ali was trying to answer, and for Radio Free Europe and other media, what if there are many voices in Iran, what if there are many voices in Egypt, even if you could not find a consensus, I think these voices should be reflected.

That is the essence of pluralism. This is the essence of democracy. Let people in the West know there are more voices in Iran, in Egypt and elsewhere, the Middle East, and as I said, so long as they respect the rules of the game, put them to the test and make your continuous dealing or transacting with them contingent on respecting the rules of the democratic game.

MR. GEDMIN: Well, it's certainly the essence of debate and pluralism in the United States. Thank you. Next question.

QUESTION: I have a question for Saad Eddin Ibrahim. Even establishments who favor the status quo face the problem that leaders who head the status quo don't live forever, and Egypt, as you pointed out, now has a ruler who has been in power for 28 years and is aging and there is likely to be a change in Egypt in some way in the next few years, whether the establishments want it or not.

I'm just wondering if you might be able to say anything about if a change takes place at the top, what the role of the U.S. government, Western governments might be, and whether that would be an opportunity when people who want to support democracy might be able to take an active role.

MR. IBRAHIM: Thank you for the question. Egyptians like to joke in politics, and the latest joke was, on the last birthday of Mubarak, which is May 4th, and he reached 84 years of age, and the joke is that he was given a tortoise, a turtle, yes, as a gift. And he said, what is so particular about getting this. So somebody said, well, it lives to over 120 years. He said, really? We'll see.

(Laughter.)

So the guy has aspiration for immortality. He does not think that he will die or that he will depart us soon. But assuming that he went, because his father died at the age of 94, so he comes from a family that lives a long time.

But having conveyed that, I think there are three standing scenarios on the scene right now. One scenario is inheritance scenario, the North Korean scenario, the Kim Il-Sung scenario, and that is the leader installing his son to inherit the power after him. This is one scenario that the entire family and the ruling party are working to implement, to make it real.

The second scenario is an army takeover, because army has been really the ruler behind the scene or the power behind the whatever for the last 60 years, since 1952. And they may not accept the son, Gamal Mubarak, Mubarak Jr., to be the ruler, especially because he is not very popular with the Egyptian people, for reasons that we get into later.

And then the third scenario is a national front scenario, and that is a scenario that I and many Egyptians in the audience are working for, and that is to get the liberal democratic forces, the whatever parties are on the scene, to create a front and to assume power probably with the help of some kind of a popular uprising or whatever, to prepare the country in the next four to five years for a true democratic governance.

And the transitional model for going from non-democratic to democratic has been, again, tried in those many countries that I mentioned before, including, let's say, Chile, Argentina and so on, so -- Portugal, Spain. So we have models of transition that is orderly and under the international eye, watchful eye, and I think Egyptians are capable of doing it. After all, many people here may not know that Egypt had its first parliament back in 1866. That is ever before Germany was created, before Italy was created.

So we have tradition. Egyptians are capable. So please do not underestimate what the democratic impulses are in my country, or in the region, for that matter, because not just Egypt. Ali mentioned the velvet revolution in Iran around the turn of the 20th century, 1904 or '06. That was a revolution. We had a similar one in Egypt 20 years earlier, and so on.

So the region has all of these ingredients. It is a question of, again, enabling them to take hold and to strike roots and to be sustainable.

MR. GEDMIN: It seems to me, Saad, that there are two mistakes that we repeat time and again, and one mistake is falling into the trap of thinking that authoritarian regimes are stable, and history does show us that they are, time and again, inherently unstable, no matter how fierce or invincible they look at a certain point.

And the other mistake you just alluded to, and we keep repeating that mistake, Ali, I think, time and again, too -- we think that a certain country or certain culture can't be capable of democracy or liberal thought because of religion or because of history or because of some particular thing that's happened in its history. We've done that with China until Taiwan, we did that with Korea until South Korea, we did it with Latin America until Costa Rica, we did it with Africa until Botswana, we did it for some time with Germany and Japan after the war, we did it with Portugal right through the 1970s. So I wanted to add that.

Let's go to another question from the audience, please.

QUESTION: I wonder if I can ask our Iranian colleague a two-part question. One, what do you think -- I know this is very hard to predict -- but what is the likelihood that the internal process in Iran will give us a way out of the showdown we see coming over the Iranian nuclear issue -- that is, kind of save us by changing the game so dramatically that a new resolution that we don't see available now becomes available?

Second, barring that kind of major discontinuity in Iran internally, what's your best feeling based on the people you're talking to, of the internal reaction to either crippling sanctions from the outside world -- however one defines those -- or military action, most likely by Israel, but perhaps by some broader coalition?

MR. AFSHARI: About your first question, I believe that in current situation, Iranian regime, they do not give up nuclear program, they continue on that. But the nuclear is not the final destination, it's a tool on the hand of the regime. It's some political game.

And they want to use this game to reach to the security policy in the region and in the world, first. And they continue and they have some check and balance within the positive and negative sides. I personally believe that if there is a very tough sanction against them, for them to prevent them to sell oil, I think that's the point that maybe the Iranian regime change their policy and stop nuclear issues.

But the second part, I'm -- from my contact, my point of view, I believe that the majority of Iranian people or the Iranian political activists, democratic activists, they are opposed to military and especially from the Israel. And I think that may be a little bit disaster on Iran in the region, and it increase the instability and the terrorism in the region.

But about the sanction, it's divisive. Some parts believes that the sanction -- some sanction, not all parts of the sanction may be useful, some smart sanction that just targeted the regime and do not damage a lot of peoples survives and people's lives in Iran.

But they need to consider human rights issue. For example, for the election in Iran, not just about the nuclear issue that was the goal of the sanction, beside the nuclear issues also at free election in Iran, for example. And use some smart sanctions, some pressure against Iran, at the same time continue to negotiate with Iran, but some conditional negotiations about this process, I believe that it may work.

MR. GEDMIN: Ali, can I follow up to John's question about military intervention? What I frequently heard before the elections in June 12th is something you alluded to, many Iranian oppositionists saying, good heavens, if you do that, it's going to push the opposition into the arms of the regime; they will find or feel that they have to stand by their country and government against a foreign intervention.

Is that actually still the same today? You said many of the activists you know would oppose an intervention, but if -- take Israel aside. As John said, if a broader international coalition felt obliged to strike at the nuclear facilities, how would the democratic opposition react today in the new light, in the new circumstances?

MR. AFSHARI: You know, democratic opposition, they oppose military. Also they oppose to continue the nuclear programs without the arguments of the international community. And they believe that Iran, it should be governed -- it should better government stop temporarily that program and give the confidence and argument of the international nuclear agency and then continue on that.

But if -- they oppose the war, but if the war happened, I'm not sure that they support the regime or they join to the regime, because in our contemporary history, we had a situation in -- after -- during the second world war, the allied countries -- Russia, Britain and U.S. attacked to Iran and asked the Reza Shah's position in Iran.

In that time the opposition not only did not support Reza Shah, also they supported the countries who attacked Iran. And in some -- now I believe that Israel is different, but in the allies and the international community, if they do war or some military approach against Iran, before that people oppose on that, but after that happened, I'm not sure that they support regime or join to the regime and struggle with countries who attack Iran.

MR. GEDMIN: Thank you. Next question, please.

QUESTION: I wonder if both of you would share a little bit of your perspective on being a political prisoner, Mr. Afshari, particularly now, what you think people are going through inside Iran, and would both of you talk a little bit about what you think the differences when foreign countries intervene on your behalf, does it make a difference and what should they do?

MR. AFSHARI: Political prisoners right now, or in my personal experience, do you mean?

MR. GEDMIN: His personal.

MR. AFSHARI: My personal experience, I was arrested several times, but the longest one, it's two years continuously. But the toughest one, that was for one year continuously I was in solitary confinement, and I was tortured physically and psychologically.

In that time they condemned me and sentenced me to overthrowing -- for overthrowing the regime by using the American agenda. In that time they believed there was a plan to ask the Iranian regime, George Tenet, the former head of the CIA, he designed that plan and sent to Iran, and the agent brought to me and for such activists like me, because in that time I was a student leader in Iran.

And they forced me to do a confession, TV confession, and talked about that plan. That's interesting, they gave me papers, but Kayhan press, is a hard-line press in Iran, and it was an article, and they asked me to use that article to do my confession.

And several times draft -- go and come back, between me and interrogators, and then they brought to the -- group of experts, a group of interrogators. They sent me back and asked me to do some corrections, and after several times it went. And finally they took me in front of the camera and I read from the papers what we prepared and the present, and also I think four times, every time between seven and eight hours the examiner practiced in the present.

And in fact it was fill, exactly in the fill, but they appeared to the people he's a voluntary interview by TV and I asked myself. And up until right now, in some courts and also in some TV, that experience repeated for another political activist that right now they are in the prison, and the same experience repeated.

And unfortunately it's the very brutal policy of the regime that they use that. And also the -- another bad experience that some activists face in that recent arrest, that's the rape, and they did rape against boy and girls in the prison. And Mr. Karroubi, one of the reformers, he has struggled against that. He wrote a letter and officially and publicly mention on that. Unfortunately the regime shot down his political party, his magazine and his media, and tried to prepare the authorities to arrest him.

And right now -- but the recent rally in both days again gave energy to the people and momentum to the movement, and I believe that it's hard for regime to continue this crackdown.

MR. GEDMIN: Ali, thank you. Saad, your experience, personal experience having been arrested, politically imprisoned?

MR. IBRAHIM: Well, I was in and out of prison three times. The first time was the worst, because that's where torture took place, and that's when I lost my health a great deal. That's why I'm walking with a cane. I used to be a runner actually, before I went to prison. I came out in a wheelchair, and I had to -- later on four surgeries in John Hopkins hospital in order to be able just to stand.

However, after that first experience, my case became a cause célèbre, and it is the second time and the third time that Western democracies began to exert pressure on the Mubarak regime. And there was the usual -- the regime said, oh, see, Western countries, especially the U.S., is defending him. It shows that he's an agent, a foreign agent. This was actually one of the charges.

However, inside the prison itself, it was an interesting, because when President Bush suspended $150 million from the Egyptian from the American aid to the Mubarak regime, and the prisoners read about it, they said, oh, you are worth $150 million? And all of a sudden my stocks in prison jump.

(Laughter.)

And this is not a laughing matter, because usually it is killers who are the most respected in prison and feared, followed by drug dealers, who have a lot of money, and they can bribe everybody and they can have a lot of comfort and a lot of amenities in prison.

And then comes a distant third political prisoners like myself. However, that was exception, when a political prisoner was talked about as being worth $150 million, I topped both the drug dealers and the killers.

And then 9/11 happened when I was in prison, in my second imprisonment. And that was a very interesting, because once the Bush administration began to do bombing of Afghanistan, and a lot of prisoners in one of the cell block began to request and to pressure the prison authority to be transferred to my cell block -- again, believing the government allegation that I'm really an American agent -- and therefore if Americans are so -- so they may bomb their own cell block, but they will not bomb the cell block I was in.

(Laughter.)

So the prison authorities actually had to plead with me to explain that this is not going to happen, because there was no room in my cell block for all of those people who requested. So there were some very interesting episodes.

Being a sociologist, of course, I put my own sociological imagination to work in prison in order to make the experience at least palatable and useful, especially because in my case, I had been to that prison three times before my case. The first time, when I was doing my research on Islamic militants -- some of my claim to fame is my early work on Islamic militants, some of whom were in prison.

The second time was a human rights defender, when I established a human rights organization. I used to frequent this prison and other prisons to investigate cases.

And the third time, when I went as a prisoner myself. And surprisingly, I found some of the people I studied 20 years earlier still in prison, and they welcomed me, of course, in their own way in prison, and they ask if I need anything. Of course I was in solitary confinement, by the way, but they managed to get to me through all kind of tricks, because they had been there for 20-plus years, so they knew the ropes inside the prison.

So there are many stories like that. And some are harsh, some are interesting, some are entertaining, but a lot of education, a lot of self-discovery, a lot of also understanding the system because the prison becomes a microcosm of the society at large. And we have one here who was a director, a warden in one of the prisons sitting there, Mr. Aifi, and he can testify to everything I'm saying.

So, yes, it was a mixed experience, painful, lost three years of my life. Out of the seven years I was convicted, I spent three, and then I was exonerated by the high court. And the high court is an independent court in Egypt. It's the only independent court that the regime has not succeeded yet in controlling. But otherwise, they have created all kind of parallel systems to the judiciary system like emergency courts, military courts, state security courts, and I was convicted initially in the first and second trial by one of those kangaroo courts, called the state security court.

But ultimately, when I went to the high court, me and 27 of my colleagues who were actually put in prison with me from Ibrahim center, were exonerated or the ruling was overturned and we were freed.

MR. GEDMIN: Saad, thank you. It seems to me we've been very fortunate for a number of reasons to have these two gentlemen with us in this program. Thanks to Foreign Policy Initiative. It was, I think, wise to have leading representatives from arguably the two most important countries in that part of the world. For reasons of population, I think Egypt is the largest, I think, with 83 million, and Iran follows --

MR. AFSHARI: With 71 million.

MR. GEDMIN: With 71 million it follows, just north of 70 million. But also because of the real existing and potential intellectual importance, Sunni and Shia respectively, throughout the region. But above all, thanks to Foreign Policy Initiative, we have two gentlemen here in this program who are articulate, eloquent, and as the last answers underscored, genuinely courageous and make -- have made and continue to make genuine sacrifice, something we can all learn from and inspires us. So, Ali, thank you very much; Saad, thank you very much; To Foreign Policy Initiative, and all of you.

(Applause.)