MR. FLY: So on that note, we decided to dedicate our first panel to a discussion of Afghanistan: The War in Washington, focusing on the politics of Afghanistan policy. Given that Afghanistan is perhaps one of the greatest political challenges facing the Administration right now as well as one of the greatest foreign policy challenges, I think we have an esteemed group of panelists here to discuss this issue.

I will note that on your agenda, it shows that Bill Kristol was going to moderate this panel. Bill is unfortunately unable to be with us today because of the death of his father, Irving Kristol, on Friday, and I want to say that we at FPI were all saddened Irving Kristol's passing, and our thoughts and prayers are with the Kristol family this week as they mourn.

To replace Bill, we were very lucky to get an excellent moderator, Jonathan Karl of ABC News, to fill in on short notice. Jonathan is ABC News Senior Congressional Correspondent, and prior to his work covering Congress, he also served as Senior Foreign Affairs Correspondent and Senior National Security Correspondent for ABC. And before joining ABC, he was a correspondent for CNN, covering Capitol Hill, the White House and the Pentagon. So I think he's a great moderator to discuss this issue.

With that, I'll turn it over to you, Jonathan, to introduce the panelists and to get us underway.

MR. KARL: All right, great. Thank you. It's a true honor to be here, and my thoughts are certainly with Bill Kristol. Irving Kristol is one of the first people I met when I moved to Washington many years ago, and was a great influence on me as he has been on so many people.

But we come together for this panel, I mean, I don't think the timing could have been any better for a discussion of Afghanistan and the war here in Washington. It's really a time of maximum peril for Afghanistan when you consider all that is coming together right now. One, you have what appears to be declining public support for the war. The most recent Washington Post-ABC News poll had 51 percent saying that the war in Afghanistan is not worth fighting, the first time we've ever seen anything like that in our poll.

There's also what appears to be declining support in Congress, Nancy Pelosi just within the last week saying that she doesn't see the support in Congress or the country for more -- sending more troops to Afghanistan -- Senator Karl Levin, Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, saying very much the same thing, and others actually calling for a timetable for withdrawal from Afghanistan.

And then of course the situation on the ground: U.S. casualties at an all time high. The Taliban appearing better organized and more lethal than they have ever been, all this coming together as the President is reviewing the new strategy document, which thanks to Bob Woodward, is in the paper today, from Stanley McChrystal. McChrystal warning that if the war is not properly resourced that the risk is failure -- stark words from Stanley McChrystal, and finally real questions about how the White House will respond to that request.

So with that, I'll introduce our panelists. They'll each offer some brief opening remarks; then we'll have a discussion, including questions from the audience. First on my left, Congressman Kirk is not only a candidate for Senate in the great state of Illinois and representative of the 10th District in Illinois, candidate for the Senate seat once occupied by a fellow by the name of Barack Obama, and once --

CONGRESSMAN KIRK: We prefer to say Roland Burris.

(Laughter.)

MR. KARL: And once I think on eBay for something. But Congressman Kirk not only of course brings the congressional perspective here, but he is a Navy Reserve Intelligence Officer at the rank of Commander, and Congressman Kirk has served in Afghanistan, in Iraq, in Haiti, in Kosovo, in Bosnia, and who knows where else, but that's a good start. So we're very honored to have Congressman Kirk here.

And next a man who needs no introduction at all, so I'll make it very brief, Dr. Zalmay Khalilzad, who is the former ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq, the United Nations, a whole variety of positions in the National Security Council, former professor at University of California Davis, former professor at Columbia University, and Dr. Khalilzad, the only professor in America that has given George Stephanopoulos a B, something that --

(Laughter and applause.)

MR. KARL: Something George is still a little bitter about. And then finally, Gen. Mark Kimmitt, who has served in senior positions at the State Department and at the Pentagon, was involved in the strategy review that led to the surge in Iraq, involved in negotiating the Status of Forces Agreement, that process with Iraq as well, and a retired military officer to the rank of Brigadier General and served as of course the spokesman for coalition forces in Iraq, and is a senior strategist at CENTCOM. So I don't think we could have asked for a better panel to look at the political, diplomatic and military implications of the war in Afghanistan.

So why don't we start here to my left with the Hon. Mark Kirk.

CONGRESSMAN KIRK: Well, thank you. Thank you, for having me. I read General McChrystal's report when it came out last night and agree with much of its proposals especially that we cannot fail in Afghanistan. It takes me back to earlier days when I was a staffer and worked with Charlie Wilson on another conflict that was essential for the security of the United States.

In the Congress I serve on the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, and it in many ways occupies the other half, critical missing part of the mission in Afghanistan, which is what I hope will be a doubling and tripling of the Afghan army and police, and then the associated PRT and other development assistance efforts that are critical in winning a counterinsurgency operation.

Much of my service on this issue was informed when in December I became the first member of Congress to serve in combat since 1942 when I was in Kandahar. And as part of NATO RC South, my particular focus was on the narcotics situation in what could be described as the heroin heartland, the Helmand River Valley, roughly 350 miles into Helmand Province where half of all heroin on the planet Earth is made. It is much of the focus of current Obama surge, which resourced a Marine Corps offensive down the Helmand River Valley to conquer this area. We have generated a large number of casualties, not because of Taliban attacks, but because of an attack by NATO on this area, taking control of a region that largely had been absent any NATO or Afghan government forces since 2000 at all.

We have seen roughly 80 to 100 million dollars in heroin profits resourcing the Taliban, especially the Quetta Shura, that General McChrystal identifies as the principal antagonist of the three identified in his report. I am concerned now that U.S. Marines for the first time in U.S. history control a major narcotics producing area, and we will need to develop a strategy about whether Marines drive by poppy fields, opium stockpiles, labs and heroin stashes, destroy them, empower Afghan police to them, or leave it undisturbed because of political implications regarding the future of our relations with the people in that key area.

I was informed by my military service when I came home, so I've initiated a number of things, small and large. Two small things I did is in the House Armed Services bill that passed the House, we switched a key thing for U.S. troops. The old idea of getting back to the base inside the wire and going to mail call is completely out of date. The first thing soldiers do when they return to their hooch, for example, at Kandahar Airfield, where we have 25,000 soldiers, is immediately log onto the Internet and skype your girlfriend or your wife. About half of soldiers' combat pay goes to Internet fees at the base. And so I worked with Chairman Skelton to make sure DOD pays those costs, because Internet mail call is now essential to troop morale. That's a small thing.

A larger thing is working with General Flynn, who was my boss as a reservist when he was the top intelligence officer at the Pentagon, is to create a corps of Afghan hands, people who sign up for the duration to ensure the success of the United States and our Afghan allies in this conflict. The original concept was a bonus of $250,000 per soldier who signed up for the duration, or six years, which was the contract that was offered in World War II, and another $250,000 if you mastered Pashtun or Dari to 4.0 or above. Half a million bucks on the table for key personnel. I would imagine about five dozen or so would sign up. And General Flynn, General McChrystal's top intelligence officer, said with that corps, that would be a transformative base of support and expertise that I could have in this conflict.

Lastly, I think support for this campaign is eroding in the Congress, I believe in error. When we see the resourcing requirement decided by the President, if he picks General McChrystal's low-risk option, which is 40,000 troops, in my judgment as an appropriator, it will trigger a supplemental appropriation request necessary to pass the Congress. That means that in my view, most Republicans will support that, and many Democrats won't, putting Speaker Pelosi and Majority Leader Hoyer in a difficult position of passing an appropriations bill absolutely depending on Republican votes to do that.

In my view, that can be done and should be done, but that would mean avoiding any pork barrel politics, keeping all non-Afghan-related items off the bill, making sure we could keep it focused and clean on what the President had chosen to do.

MR. KARL: Ambassador?

AMBASSADOR KHALILZAD: Well, thank you very much. It is clear that the policy on Afghanistan is heading towards a crisis, and I'm very familiar with this potential because of my experience in Iraq.

In 2006, you saw a very substantial polarization here at home because -- an erosion of support because there was a widespread perception that what we were doing in Iraq was not working and that our strategy was not producing the results that were promised, and people were losing confidence therefore in the enterprise. And that reflected itself in the debate and discussion in Congress. And it took a very substantial effort and leadership by President Bush to change the strategy and require resources, along with other things that were bearing fruit in Iraq to change that situation on the ground in Iraq.

In Afghanistan, it is clear that because of increased casualties, because of a widespread perception that security is worsening, there is a loss of confidence that we know what we're doing. I don't think it's to say that people think Afghanistan is not important or the war against terror is not important, or the future of that region is not important for the security of the United States. Although in the debate those arguments now are made, I think it is because people don't know or don't believe that the path that we're on now with the strategy and resources that we have, that we can achieve the stated objectives or goals.

And, therefore, you are beginning to see a polarization which is inevitable in situations like that, some arguing that it is very important, as we heard from the congressman, and I agree with him that it's very important that we succeed in Afghanistan, and therefore we need to do what's necessary in terms of adjusting strategy and resources required to achieve our goals, while others are saying perhaps you can achieve -- can redefine the goals and do less to achieve those lesser goals, and others, a third group saying let's abandon the effort. They may not use those words, more or less, let's cut our losses and come home.

And I believe that of course the last group if we were to achieve -- to adopt that approach of cutting our losses and coming home -- it would be a major victory clearly for Al-Qaeda and extremists. I think it's not only in Afghanistan that the Taliban and extremists would overrun much of the country. I don't know whether the capital will survive in that situation. But Afghanistan will go back broadly to the way it was for a while, like the early 1990s, and maybe later like it was in the late 1990s, and we've been there and done that. And the damage to U.S. prestige and credibility around the world and the risk that the world will face, not only the United States, from extremists and Al-Qaeda terrorists would grow very, very dramatically. It will be similar in some ways as the impact that the Soviets suffered, not exactly in the same way, the debacle in Afghanistan after the Mujahedeen felt that they had defeated, with our support, the Soviet Union.

So it is really the debate is going to be focused on whether we can achieve success in Afghanistan or can we redefine the goals and do offshore attacks against terrorists and build up the Afghan forces, negotiating with the Taliban and strengthening, helping the Afghan government and institution.

There is some merits in some of these ideas, but I think fundamentally, the approach to cut back the goals and do things through negotiations seem to be a very risky proposition, because essentially, it takes us back in fundamental ways to our policy prior to 9/11. We were offshore. We didn't attack. We tried to reach out to the Taliban. One of my predecessors in the UN, the governor of New Mexico, went to talk with the Taliban. And the question of the building up of the Afghan forces I think has got to be as the congressman said, part of a success strategy. I agree with that. I think we should have done that earlier, to do more, but it was not done because the Afghan economy was not big enough to sustain a big force, and we didn't want to take on the responsibility for sustaining such a large force.

Clearly breaking up elements of the Taliban and getting people to abandon -- working with the Taliban is very important also for success. But I think that negotiations with the Taliban as a whole, I don't see that as a near-term realistic proposition, because at the time that they are doing well and they know that we're not doing as well and the Afghan government is not doing that well, to expect them to pursue a U.S.-favored, preferred strategy to help us, is unrealistic. I think these negotiations tend to work, the record of other insurgencies show, when the government and the coalition side is winning. And that's the time that prospects for successful negotiations, on your terms rather than theirs, become a realistic proposition.

I also don't believe that we can count on the Taliban having learned their lesson that if they were to take over Afghanistan, they would not work with Al-Qaeda like they did before, because it is that coalition that is producing the success that they are having, and it's going to be difficult for them, unrealistic in my judgment, for all of Taliban then to change their spots. We have made this mistake a few times in the past where we have assumed that someone, because of some experience, has changed their spots.

We did that of course in the case of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, after the Iran-Iraq war, a lot of people at that time argued that Saddam had learned his lesson, would behave differently, but, you know, he hasn't changed his spots, and soon after the Iran-Iraq war, Kuwait happened. I believe that it's very important for success to do a few things, and I hope that as the debate intensifies it will focus on it.

One, we haven't really pursued an effective counterinsurgency strategy that's based on population protection, and that, General McChrystal is embracing it. I think this is what we ultimately pursued in Iraq as well, and that -- the requirements in terms of resources -- we must in my judgment pursue that goal, and I support that.

Second, I think it is very important that we pay attention to one issue that in the debate has not yet gotten the attention that it deserves. It is the issue of sanctuary for the Taliban. I think that without the sanctuary in Pakistan, the Taliban would not be as effective as they are. That's where they train and recruit and rest and recover and get the resources that they need. And in insurgencies, sanctuaries are very important. And I think we've got to find an effective way, and I hope we'll have a chance to talk about that, to focus more sharply than we have on that issue.

The third thing is that we need to have an effective partnership between the coalition and the Afghan government. Success will depend a lot on the Afghans also having to do what they need to do in terms of rule of law, in terms of justice, in terms of governance issues. And there is a need for a new compact, whoever ultimately becomes the winner in Afghanistan, between the coalition and it, for moving forward.

And lastly, it's vital I think that we bring the other elements of our power to bear to achieve the success that we need. Our military folks have done a tremendous job. They constantly do a tremendous job for us. But I think the civilian part of the government, because a lot of stuff that is needed in population protection, effective counterinsurgency strategy, as the congressman was saying, requires skills and developments that are not best handled by the military, effective as they are in a lot of things. And we need to -- we have not done a good job in Afghanistan for a long time to bring those elements together.

And lastly, to bring the economy, economic power to bear on it, too. Because as long as there's a lot of unemployment, poverty, given the ineffectiveness of the government put together, they become vulnerable to people of Afghanistan, too, to extremists. There is a big employment center in Kabul that people who need daily work go, and I am told that by noon, 60 percent or so do not get jobs, and by one o'clock, they're willing to work for food for their family for the day if they could get that.

So seven or eight years into our presence there, with the economy being that way, that is an advertisement that we're not doing well, and it's an opportunity for the Taliban and others.

So I think we haven't fought this war with full capacity or anywhere near full capacity, and the time has come to adjust. And I think it will only happen and will rally the country if the President takes the lead in defining not only the importance of the success here, but also of a strategy that is resource, that can convince the people that there is a reasonable relationship between the ends that we seek and the means that we are devoting to achieve those goals.

Thank you very much.

MR. KARL: General?

GENERAL KIMMITT: Well, I think Professor Khalilzad, Ambassador Khalilzad, could not have had a better segue to what I'd like to talk about. Because I believe that in this discussion on the war in Washington, we seem to be missing a key element, which is the central issue is not the strategy for Afghanistan. The central issue is not the troops needed or the resources needed. The central issue is will America provide the domestic support and the extended patience necessary to achieve U.S. strategic goals?

This question is keyed to the ongoing strategic review and the follow-on Administration plans. You know, the military over time since we've started to fight in Afghanistan and Iraq has gone from understanding that the center of gravity is not defeat of the enemy forces, but in fact support of the local population. I believe that at this point in the Afghanistan war, even that is inconsequential. We will defeat the enemy forces. We will protect the population, but the center of gravity is not the support of the local population, but the support of the U.S. population.

It's true, as was mentioned here, I associate myself with the comments of everyone that we're going to need more troops, we're going to need more resources, we're going to need a better strategy. But let's be clear. There are more than sufficient available resources for this fight. The major danger in Afghanistan is not winning -- not losing what we call a war of attrition. In a war of attrition, the objective of the enemy is to defeat the other enemy. In a war of exhaustion, which is what we are seeing in Afghanistan, the effort is to tire out the other nation, defeat the other nation's will to fight.

Let's be clear. The British Empire was not defeated by attrition in Afghanistan, nor was the Soviet Union defeated in Afghanistan through attrition. They were defeated through exhaustion, and this is how the Taliban intends to prosecute this war. Listen to what Mullah Omar recently said. We fought against the British invaders for 80 years, from 1839 to 1919. Today we have the same strong determination, the military training and effective weapons, but still more, we have preparedness for a long war. And on September 11th, Osama said, our fighters will wear down the U.S. coalition in Afghanistan like we exhausted the Soviet Union for ten years until it collapsed.

Al-Qaeda clearly plans to defeat us through exhaustion, not through attrition. It is telling us we can fight until you're tired, until your nation is dispirited, until your patience runs out. Unfortunately, back here in Washington, the argument seems to be and focus on the stuff, the physical capability to fight the war, the proper U.S. troop levels, the right number of civilians and aid workers. The debate on capability, that debate is necessary, it's important, but it is insufficient. The real war in Washington must be to achieve and maintain the will of the American people, because without that, the capabilities are sure to prove insufficient, and strategic patience is sure to wane.

I don't believe it's hyperbole to suggest that the American people, the support of the American people, is the center of gravity for the next ten years. Now this will be a difficult but essential task for the Administration, a number of hurdles to cross, that have already been mentioned. America's tired of the war. In many ways, we're war weary, and America is impatient. But frankly, regardless of the reasons and choices that brought Afghanistan to its current environment, it is unlikely that Americans will demonstrate the same measure of patience without a focused effort to make the case for prolonged sacrifices.

Most observers agree that the situation in Afghanistan in 2009 is far worse than at any point in the past. Americans can tolerate many things, but they're also quick to recognize wasted effort and sunk costs. No existential threat is believed to emerge from Afghanistan today. Rather, the typical press story is governmental corruption, a resurgent Taliban, and allies unwilling to bear the same burdens as us.

Unlike Iraq's many advantages, which our military and diplomatic leaders such as Ambassador Khalilzad skillfully leveraged to achieve significant progress, Afghanistan is a poor, undereducated and sparse land with few natural endowments. And expecting a significant turnaround in the same period of time as we expected in the surge in Iraq is highly unlikely.

And let's also be candid. Afghanistan competes with other Administration priorities. This Administration's priority list does include Afghanistan. But health care, economic recovery, cap and trade legislation and a host of other domestic issues compete for that level of attention. But regardless of these challenges, the Administration must directly face the centrality of popular support to the war effort.

If success in Afghanistan is important, as Ambassador Khalilzad said, then the case must be made to the American people in the next few months, and sustained over the next few years. Success in Afghanistan will not come quickly, and a skeptical America must be persuaded to give the strategy the time it needs and the resources it requires.

Some people get this. If you listened to Senator Lugar last week, he said: An integrated strategy has yet to be unveiled despite the many high and low-level reviews. And none has been described with the force and conviction necessary to persuade the American people to endorse what will likely be a much longer albeit necessary commitment to achieve stability in the region. Without that broad-based domestic support behind the effort, no amount of resources, no amount of troops or civilians will be sufficient. With the support and patience of the American people, everything is possible.

So where does the responsibility lie? Some suggest that General McChrystal ought to come back and take on the job to speak to the American people. This isn't Stan's job alone. There are three layers between him and the American people. His boss is General Petraeus, General Petraeus's boss is the SECDEF, and ultimately President Obama. Secretary Gates has been forward leaning on this issue, and so has General Petraeus.

But when it comes to rallying the American people behind a cause, the commander in Afghanistan, the commander in Tampa, the Secretary of Defense in Washington D.C. may be important voices, but not the central voice in that discussion. That voice is the only voice that matters, the only voice in the chain of command elected by the American people, and that's President Obama, and he ultimately bears the responsibility to make the case and win the case with the American people.

If this war is to be won, it will require more capability. For that we can depend on the Department of Defense, Department of State and other cabinet agencies to find the civilians and find the money for this enterprise. But as I said earlier, capability is insufficient. It will also require domestic will. It must get domestic will, popular support and strategic patience.

The Congress, DOD and State can help out, but only the President can achieve a popular mandate for Afghanistan. Only the President can ask Americans to endure years of sacrifice. Only the President can build support for a protracted struggle that in his own words is a war of necessity. And only the President can harness domestic will, popular support and strategic patience, those indispensable elements for success without which our efforts in Afghanistan can't succeed.

Let me finish up by a quote that Elliot Cohen made in 2003 regarding Iraq, and it's just as important today for Afghanistan. He said, speaking of Afghanistan, he says no one else will take on the burdens. Talking of handing it over to the United Nations or NATO is wishfulness. It is not strategy. Whatever one's views of the war's rationale, its conception, its planning or conduct, our war it remains, and we best figure out how to win it.

Thank you.

MR. KARL: All right. Thank you. Well, let's pick it up right there with the President, his last major speech on this was in March on the war where he outlined what he said in very stark terms, his goal. And I want to read exactly what he said, clear and focused goal. To disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al-Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Now we most recently heard from the President on this -- I don't know if you noticed he was on a couple, four or five talk shows yesterday, and not surprisingly, much of the questions were on Afghanistan. And there seemed to be a change in rhetoric from the President. He talked about the need to narrow the mission. He said this has been his goal, is to narrow the mission in Afghanistan.

And he said that one of the problems has been mission creep, that we've tried to do too much in Afghanistan. And he said that the 21,000 troops that he ordered in February sent to Afghanistan, additional troops, were sent to secure the elections, which was not an argument that I had heard when he actually ordered those -- he made that order in February. But now he said those troops were sent to secure the elections, raising the question of whether or not that means now that the elections are over, they come home.

Ambassador Khalilzad, what is your read on where the President is going to come down on this?

AMBASSADOR KHALILZAD: I don't know. Clearly there is some confusion about both the goals, at least it doesn't come across very clearly, and the means. One, on the goals, securing the election, if that was the objective, clearly maybe things would have been a lot worse than they were, but the elections, you had a participation level because of in part insecurity, below 38 percent, maybe around 30 percent. That's not very good. Because in a previous election, they had a 70 percent of eligible people participating.

I believe that this -- clearly having a sharp focus and having again the necessary strategy and means to achieve that goal is very important. But it is vital to understand that the terror of Al-Qaeda and the insurgency of the Taliban are intertwined. And I don't believe that you can achieve the splitting of the two and going to only a counter-terror approach without successful counterinsurgency against the Taliban, to coerce them.

Because reconciliation in my view is very contingent on conditions. Some circumstances, there are better prospects of succeeding than others. And there are two ways that I think counterinsurgency can make progress. One is if the sanctuary is ended or it's at risk. If tomorrow the Taliban leadership which is sitting in Qatar or Karachi or whatever is no longer allowed to operate, the sanctuary is at risk, I think you improve your prospect.

The other is if you can implement over time a successful counterinsurgency population protection, you coerce them to a situation where they have either to accept total defeat or come to the table. And I think that it is wishful thinking, and I sometimes worry that maybe some people in the Administration may be embracing this, that you could do a pure counter-terror approach, which is what the strategy largely was for many years in Afghanistan, was we went after the terrorists and some extremists. We didn't do a population protection counterinsurgency.

So I think if we narrowly focus on a counter-terror strategy, I think we'll lose at the end, because the insurgency will gain. And once the insurgency has won, as General McChrystal warned the risk of, I think the counter-terror in Afghanistan would be much harder than to do once they've got the playing field, the sanctuary of Afghanistan once again with the population and with the Taliban and its support.

MR. KARL: But clearly, Congressman, the President is under pressure from the people that got him elected to do exactly what he said yesterday, which is to narrow the mission, which would -- now he hasn't -- we don't know what he's going to do on a request from McChrystal for more troops, but narrowing the mission doesn't sound like initiating a broad new counter-terrorism, you know, counter-terrorism, a project to protect the civilization -- protect the citizens -- doesn't exactly sound like narrowing the mission.

CONGRESSMAN KIRK: That's right. I think the President has burned a phenomenal amount of capital on the health care issue, and he's not winning. The result of his speech was a bump, not a long-term support. So opposition to the health care bill is now 56 percent ten days after the speech. He's consistently signaled to the Congress, that is his number one priority, and so as he loses steam, an Administration loses political authority on many other issues as well. He knows he has to turn the political situation of support in the Congress around prior to congressional elections, which are next November. And this could be a drag on the party base.

I thanked him publicly for the decision he made in January. We had a proposal that I was a very tiny part of, going up through the NATO chain of command to DOD, for an Afghan surge. It ended up being a struggle between Secretary Clinton and Vice President Biden in the Oval Office. Vice President Biden wanted to reduce our goals in Afghanistan, and return to what I would consider more of a 1990s policy with regard to that country. But that is a highway straight to 9/11. I think the President rightly sided with Secretary of State Clinton and backed the Afghan surge.

Now as the surge was deployed, it wasn't to secure the Afghan elections. It was one brigade to secure Kabul, and the Taliban ran away from that province, so there was not the expected battle that we thought. Another brigade was to secure the border with Pakistan in the south, and then the three others were to execute the Helmand River offensive, which is ongoing right now by the Marine Corps.

I think it would be wise to side with General McChrystal, who has been very clear. It represents a big change for the troops. You know, when we went outside the wire, force protection was everything. Our standard mission was a four- or eight-hour mission, full battle rattle, all armor, absolutely no contact with the public. We just would run through an area showing presence.

When you switch from knocking down doors in the middle of night in support of special operations, which is a counter-terror strategy, to putting troops and platoons in charge of making sure that a mayor or a district governor survives the night, that is an entirely different strategy, and troops are not in armored vehicles, they're not fully protected. General McChrystal highlights that well. But I think that's the right way to go.

And the last thing I said, there's only one quote in his, General McChrystal's, report. And that's from General Wardak, who is the Minister of Defense of Afghanistan. And he took on one key thing that's important in a congressional debate. General Wardak said, I reject the myth advanced by the media that Afghanistan is the graveyard of empires and that the U.S. and NATO effort is designed to fail. Afghans have never seen you as occupiers, even though this is the focus of the enemy's propaganda campaign. Unlike the Russians who imposed a government with an alien ideology, you enabled us to write a democratic constitution and choose our own government. And unlike the Russians, who destroyed our country, you have come to rebuild.

And there is a residual opposition to the Taliban. They had their chance, and they messed it up, and the Afghan people know that.

MR. KARL: But if you look at the goal, again, what he said was the clear and focused goal back in March in Afghanistan, and if it is again to disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al-Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, can you accomplish that with something other than the counterinsurgency strategy that McChrystal has outlined, which by definition is going to require a lot more troops? Can you do it -- I mean, George Will has suggested, you know, kind of do it from afar, from offshore -- can it be done from a military perspective and different strategy?

GENERAL KIMMITT: No. Frankly, I don't think it can. I mean, if you read through Stan's report, it is very comprehensive. He does recognize that this isn't just a straight military strategy. It needs to be a comprehensive approach, a counterinsurgency strategy. And even though it is distinctly -- the conditions are distinctly different than Iraq, primarily what Ambassador Khalilzad noted, which is that there is an external sanctuary, I don't see how you can do this smaller rather than larger. I don't see how you could take the strategy that is being, or the strategy that I think all of us are envisioning, and take out elements of that and try to find economies, either in terms of troops or resources. And it is certainly not the case that sitting in a boat offshore, shooting a couple of cruise missiles at Tarmiyah farms will ever work again.

So if President Obama is not going to, is going to not agree to this request, and again, we expect it'll come in three different choices -- if he's not going to agree, is it up to, as one of my colleagues said after hearing the President yesterday, that General McChrystal should resign? I mean, does it get to that point? Because this is a fundamental question: Are we going to go with a counterinsurgency strategy or are we not?

If it's not going to be resourced, does he resign? Well, it is always the responsibility of a commander, when he loses the trust and confidence of his superiors, to offer his resignation. And if in fact Stan is unable to make the case to the President and Secretary of Defense and the Central Command Commander, that his strategy is the right one to follow, most commanders would offer their resignation in return. But I don't think we're going to get to that dramatic of a position.

Frankly, what we're -- I think most of us are hearing right now in the press is just setting the conditions for the eventual announcement. I mean, you think about the President's dilemma. He is on one hand an elected politician representing the Democratic Party. On the other hand, he's the President of the United States. And on the third hand, he is the Commander in Chief, and he's got to balance all of those requirements.

I think you know what I believe in this case he needs to lean more heavily towards, but it is certainly the case that over the next couple of months he's going to in his own private counsel try to balance all those so he comes up with a strategy that seems to satisfy all of those constituencies.

But going back to your first point, if in fact the satisfaction of his constituencies can only be done with a low ball strategy, I would not be surprised to see that some people will say, make the comment, it can't be done, or I'm not capable of doing it. Maybe somebody else is.

MR. KARL: Ambassador?

AMBASSADOR KHALILZAD: I think two points. One, the President needs to appreciate that the popular support that is currently evaporating or reducing significantly, is condition-based. Now if he -- it is not an independent variable, so to speak. It's very much of a dependent variable. And if he does the right thing in terms of a counterinsurgency strategy that we have been talking about, I think he would get room, political room, and he would get time from the American people. I think we sometimes exaggerate that the American people are impatient. We all repeat that.

But I think it's very much -- they were very patient during the Cold War, which was a different kind of struggle, lasted a long time, and huge resources were required. I think you lose the American people when they think you don't know what you're doing or that this is a wasted effort. You're not succeeding. And therefore if he sticks with the case that he has made before, that this is very important for the security of the American people, and second then he puts in place a strategy and the resources necessary that people can see that you are making progress, politics will work his way. Things will get a lot worse very quickly in my view, and General McChrystal was the premier counter-terrorist in his background. He's not -- his background -- it's not that he spent a lot of time in counterinsurgency.

MR. KARL: Right.

AMBASSADOR KHALILZAD: And he has come to view that in order to do the counter-terror effectively, you need to do a counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan, I think he will face even bigger political problems here in my view if he was to come on the wrong side of that. And it's my hope and my expectation that he won't do that.

MR. KARL: But there's a fact on the ground that muddies the water here, and it's the one we haven't mentioned yet, which is the elections. We have these presidential elections in Afghanistan that are widely seen as fraudulent, by some estimates up to 25 percent of the ballots cast fraudulently cast. How do you move forward with a bold counterinsurgency strategy at a time when the president is widely seen as illegitimate? You know, as one member of Congress said to me, one of your colleagues said, you know, how do we expend blood and treasure on a, you know, to support a government that is not legitimate, American blood and treasure?

CONGRESSMAN KIRK: I'd first say let's go back to what our objectives are. Our objectives primarily are to protect the United States and to make sure 9/11 doesn't happen again. For me in Illinois, that's easy to explain. We're home to the tallest building in North America. And my job as congressman, hopefully as a senator, is to make sure everybody in the Sears Tower can come home tomorrow night. And so that's our basic mission in Afghanistan.

Then to say, I don't think we have an illegitimate president. I think we have a flawed election and a set of decisions to make about whether a coalition government is put together or a new election is called. But either option --

MR. KARL: But that's not our decision, is it? I mean, how --

CONGRESSMAN KIRK: No, it's not our decision. But it plays a role in how effective and how we can support the mission. But in the end, each alternative is better than letting go.

MR. KARL: How much harder is it for you to make the case in Congress if there is not another election?

CONGRESSMAN KIRK: Oh, it's harder. It's harder. But in the end, we have expended so much effort to lift an Army into Central Asia. We have accomplished some pretty tough things. Well, actually, Zal was the guy who did a lot of it --

AMBASSADOR KHALILZAD: Thank you.

CONGRESSMAN KIRK: -- which is we got an interim facility in. We got the United Nations to recognize a procedure to create a government. That government was then created and that government has succeeded in securing much of the central cities of Afghanistan, a major feat for a country eleven time zones away, in a country that has no ports. So this is a major feat.

But in the last years of the Bush Administration, this was an economy of force operations. Now it is the central military focus of the Obama Administration, and in my view, the Obama Administration in the end shouldn't be wary of a tough political job ahead. Because if you run your administration so that you will only sustain and continue activities that only an overwhelming majority of Democratic members will support, then you're leading Democrats in the United States, not Americans.

At key points in President Clinton's term, he led the whole country, even when a majority of Democrats was opposed, probably the best example being NAFTA, which was tremendously in the long-term economic interest of North America, or welfare reform, another one. And there are key moments in a president's term when you lead the country, not necessarily your party, and I would say this is one of them.

GENERAL KIMMITT: Winston Churchill once said it's very hard to lead from the front with your ear stuck to the ground, and this is a good example of that.

MR. KARL: I want to get to some questions from all of you, but first, Ambassador, what is your read of how we deal with the mess that's come out of the elections in Afghanistan?

AMBASSADOR KHALILZAD: I think that we need to work the process, the Afghan constitution, election laws of a path for dealing with the problem, and we need to work with that. I think sometimes one of the difficulties we have had in recent weeks and months to get the Afghan government to do what it ought to do has been that there is a crisis of trust between the president and the government and some key players here now. And we need to sort of overcome that. There is a grievance commission that looks at the complaints and charges of fraud, three very distinguished foreigners on it and two Afghans, one is quite independent.

I think we have to support and get everyone to support what that commission that the constitution of Afghanistan and the laws, election laws, provide is worked with and accepted. If after looking at the ballots they decide that the president has won by whatever, 51 or 52 percent -- now they're saying it's 54 -- that, you know, gets a legitimate outcome. If it says, no, the president got less than 50 percent, then there is a second round if it becomes necessary.

There are a lot of other political issues and discussions that are going on about some other outcome, some other arrangement and agreement that would be legitimate there, and we would have to also take that option into account.

So I think that clearly this election was not done the way it should have been done. I think preparations were lacking, supervision was lacking. But we are where we are. But there is, thank goodness, that the laws and the constitution has put forward the remedy, an institutional remedy to deal with it, and we ought to work with that.

MR. KARL: Well, what's your read, how likely is that process to lead to another -- a runoff election?

AMBASSADOR KHALILZAD: Well, I think there are two options. Either they will say that it's, one, that President Karzai has won, or that he has not. And I think the difference isn't going to be that great. It's either going to be 51, 52 or it's going to be 49 something. So it's in that range where the answer will lie. And either way, I think we should be able to work with it so that they overcome the current political crisis that Afghanistan is in.

MR. KARL: Okay. All right. Do we have any questions? Yes, back there. And I think there's a mic right here. Question to my right.

QUESTION: Thank you. Matt Duss for American Progress. Ambassador Dr. Khalilzad, in discussing the surge or counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan in reference to Iraq, is there a danger really of ignoring some of the other factors that were in play in Iraq such as the sectarian cleansing, the reversal of large factions of the Sunni insurgency, is there a danger in really not taking those into account when trying to import that strategy in Afghanistan? And is there any evidence that some of those factors may be in play in Afghanistan now?

AMBASSADOR KHALILZAD: Well, when one says similar it's not the same. Clearly, the situation in Iraq in my view was worse in some ways than it is in Afghanistan. The level of violence against us, the coalition, and Iraqis against each other, was much higher than it is even now in Afghanistan. And there was a danger of the country falling apart there along sectarian lines, and that with the attack on the mosque, that risk increased dramatically. And there was a particular risk to the capital city. Baghdad, was a focal point of that conflict at that time.

Now in the case of Afghanistan, there are differences. But in terms of principles, of effective counterinsurgency, I'm not looking -- I'll give an example of Iraq because I was there, I'm familiar with it. But if you look at the history of counterinsurgency strategies where you're looking at Algeria, to -- which wasn't effective -- to Malaysia, which was, you will see that where you have, you pursue a population protection strategy you have the confidence of the people, where they feel that by working with you they're not risking themselves. You have a better prospect for success.

And I believe that in Afghanistan, you do have more of a classic insurgency with the sanctuary, with some base of popular support. Not a lot, because all indications are that the Afghans have experienced the rule of the Taliban by substantial numbers. They don't want to go back to that. And so if they are not supporting in the coalition of the government it is because in the case of government, the confidence necessary is not there.

And in terms of the coalition, it is -- maybe there are some complaints about some tactics, but more likely than any other factor it is because of fear, that if they supported the coalition, and the coalition is not there constantly with the people to protect them, and they come in during the day for an hour and then they leave, that at night, the night is Taliban's, and they will come into their homes and shoot and kill them and so on.

So therefore I think it's a necessary requirement for success in Afghanistan, given the situation there, that we go to a counterinsurgent strategy. But the counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan would not be identical to the counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq. It would have its own features, its own elements. But the elements will be the same. We will have to work with some people, try to get them to cooperate with us, even some who are with the Taliban, to win him over and so forth. There will be similarities, but there will be distinct differences as well.

MR. KARL: Yes? Right there.

QUESTION: Good morning. Bob Dreyfuss with the Nation magazine. Until recently, very few people have challenged the notion of safe haven as a key point in the war. But recently, Paul Pillar wrote an op ed in the Washington Post doing exactly that, saying that the assumption that Al-Qaeda having a safe haven in Afghanistan really isn't the defining issue and that perhaps, you know, safe havens from Hamburg to London to Somalia would be equally dangerous for a global organization.

Steve Walt has raised the same question in debates over at the AF-PAK channel. And so I guess I'm wondering whether you've seen any signs that the Administrative is rethinking this notion that a safe haven for Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, even the shattered Al-Qaeda as it exists today, is really something that should be the central focus of our effort there? And I guess as a footnote, I'll say, and if so, why aren't we in Yemen or Somalia or anywhere else? General?

GENERAL KIMMITT: Well, I think the key point is certainly you can have a small capability in Hamburg, in Paris, in other countries around the world. But what Afghanistan provided Al-Qaeda in the pre-9/11 time period was an operational base. A base not simply where you could work small operations, onesies and twosies, but could actually conduct training, could maintain sanctuary, could grow and become far more capable.

And that's the real danger of returning Afghanistan to the pre-9/11 time period, is that it's not simply that it might be yet one of the many small outposts of Al-Qaeda, but in fact that it could become, as it names belies, the base for Al-Qaeda operations around the world. That's why we need to have major concerns about what's happening in Somalia, as Jonathan said, what's happening in Yemen. There's somewhat of a tipping point in terms of size and scale where Al-Qaeda can become more than simply a local threat to where it can become an international threat. And as Congressman Kirk reminds us, this is really all about maintaining the defense of America. And when you had an Al-Qaeda presence in Sudan, then had an Al-Qaeda presence in Afghanistan, there it was large enough, safe enough and long-standing enough that it could actually plan to go against "the far enemy" as they talk about in their doctrine.

MR. KARL: Unfortunately, we have time for only one more question. Yes, right here. Yes.

QUESTION: Jennifer Rubin from Commentary Magazine. General, you mentioned that the President is in the process of weighing many competing concerns. Do you take from the fact that we read the report of the recommendation of General McChrystal on the front page of the Washington Post today that there is a frustration with the pace of that decisionmaking? And can you also comment on the downside of dragging this process out for weeks or months, either politically or militarily?

GENERAL KIMMITT: Yeah. I've been asked that question a number of times in the last couple of days, this notion of how long does the President have before he has to make a decision? Participating in the Iraq surge discussions, the National Security Council's strategy review, I'd remind people that that piece didn't come together immediately either.

It was clear that at that time General Casey sent up his recommendations. They were deliberated in the fall of 2006. The president -- the decisions, the recommendations of the Iraq surge were made to the president in, if I remember, late November, early December. And January 7th I believe is when the president made the speech.

It is not a matter of days or weeks, whether he makes it this Tuesday or next Tuesday, or quite frankly, whether he makes it this month or next month. It is by his own admission a strategy that's going to need some deliberation, but even more importantly, is going to need some firming up in terms of support from the United States Congress and from our international allies.

And I believe the commanders on the ground would rather have a strategy that's well thought through, a strategy that is firmly supported, and a strategy that will be patiently adhered to than a strategy that is pronounced quickly. There's an old saying in the military, we don't want to rush to failure. And I think in the strategy development that we're talking about for Afghanistan, I don't believe the President wants nor the commander seeks a rush to failure.

MR. KARL: All right. On that note, thank you very much, and Congressman. Ambassador. General, I thank you.

(Applause.)