MR. KAGAN: Hi, everyone, I'm Bob Kagan, at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and one of the directors of the Foreign Policy Initiative, and I want to welcome you to our second panel and discussion today. And we're quite honored to have with us one of the leading experts on foreign and defense policy in the U.S. Congress, Senator Jon Kyl.

Senator Kyl, as I'm sure you all know, was elected to the Senate from Arizona in 1994, reelected in 2000 and 2006, after having served four terms in the U.S. House of Representatives. He's the Republican Whip, which makes him the second ranking member of the Senate Republican leadership, serves on the Senate Finance Committee, where he's the ranking Republican on the sub-committee on Taxation and IRS Oversight, he's also on the Judiciary Committee and the ranking Republican on the sub-committee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security.

As I said, he's one of the leading experts on foreign policy and defense policy, and he's going to talk for 15, 20 minutes or more, and then we will have a conversation, which I will ask Senator Kyl some questions, and then we'll open it up to you all to ask Senator Kyl some more questions.

So please join me in welcoming Senator Kyl.

(Applause.)

SENATOR KYL: Thanks, Bob. Thank you, thanks very much. First I note that Bill Kristol, of course, is not with us today, and I know that we all join in expressing our sympathy to Bill and his family for his father's passing; a true giant in American history.

Well, what a difference a year makes. Remember the campaign? It was just a year ago that Barack Obama was campaigning for a new approach to foreign policy. We would work cooperatively with others, whereas the Bush administration only wanted to go it alone. We would not be afraid to talk to any nation, even including Iran. We would rebuild the U.S.-Russia relationship, presumably damaged by George Bush, despite his considerable focus on the U.S.-Russia relationship.

It boiled down to a promise that if elected Obama would not be Bush, and it came to be known as "reset." Now, as President, in July, in Moscow, President Obama announced, "that the President and I agreed that the relationship between Russia and the United States has suffered from a sense of drift. We resolve to reset U.S.-Russian relations, so that we can cooperate more effectively in areas of common interest."

Well, now I think we have an idea of what the President means by reset, specifically relating to Russia and Iran. And that's what we'll discuss today. I would submit to you that the early returns are not encouraging; that Russia has hurt, not helped our efforts to stop the Iranian nuclear program; that we've conceded too much for too little in the START negotiations; that we've not convincingly interposed any objection to Russian action in places like Georgia, Ukraine and elsewhere; and just late last week we caved in to Russia's demand that we scrap missile defense plans in Poland and the Czech Republic.

Much of this failure, I believe, is due to lack of clear-eyed understanding of Russia today. Formulating a policy for relations with Russia should start with an appreciation of Russia's quest for a restoration of its empire. A narrative of Russian policy since the Putin era began, as he put it, is that the fall of the Soviet Union was a historical tragedy, actually the greatest geo-political catastrophe of the 20th century -- Putin's own words.

This perspective motivates Russian policy to reestablish hegemony over its former Soviet republics and the captive nations under the Soviets' control. If these nations fall further into the orbit of the West -- read America and NATO -- then there's less hope for restoration of this once great empire, they reason.

Another Russian interest of course always at play in its foreign policy is enhancing its economic position, which is overly dependent on the price of oil and gas. So keeping things stirred up in the Persian Gulf region, for example, does elevate the price of petroleum.

So how should the U.S. be informed by these propositions? First we need to decide whether it matters to us that Russia would reestablish significant influence or control over the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

The answer to most of us is too obvious to require articulation, but apparently not so to some in the Obama administration, and there's precedent for their thinking. Recall that accommodating our Cold War policy to captive nations was for a long time deemed the less bad alternative to direct confrontation with the Soviet Union.

In many ways, Obama's policy is reminiscent of détente during the Cold War. And what we've seen when the Obama administration makes policy with regard to Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, is it not the case that the first question seems to be, how will Moscow react? Is this really progress when we seek a new Russian policy? How is this an improvement from where we were before Ronald Reagan decided that we needed to confront evil that was the Soviet Union?

Here is the question I have: If freedom and security of Russia's neighbors is threatened today, is Obama with Carter or Reagan? That's the test. Perhaps the clearest test case now defining the new policy of the Obama administration is reflected in the decision last Thursday to stop implementation of the Bush plan to deploy an operational ballistic missile defense in Poland and the Czech Republic.

Now, let me be fair to the Obama administration. Unlike the clumsy, unilateral decisions of the Bush administration, the Obama administration was clever and transparent and sophisticated. It phoned the Czech and Polish governments early on the morning of the 70th anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Poland, after the news had leaked, and I believe after Russia had been informed. George Bush and Condi Rice would have had to have worked pretty hard to top that for classy diplomacy.

The implications of the decision on American and European defense against an Iranian ballistic missile attack are significant. But my focus today is on the international political implications of the decision.

Poland and the Czech Republic are democratic nations with defense cooperation agreements with the United States. Both are members of NATO. And both have sent their soldiers to support the United States in Iraq and the entire NATO alliance in Afghanistan. And in both cases, I think it's fair to say that these nations have done so with a vigor and an enthusiasm for helping to liberate other oppressed peoples that is not shared by most of their Western European counterparts.

And everyone knows the fear these countries have, that if the stakes with the Russians got high enough, they could again be thrown under the bus, as they were after World War II. And who would blame them for concluding that that's just exactly what happened.

Here are the headlines from last Thursday's action, from the largest Czech daily newspaper: "No radar, Russia won." From a Polish paper: "Betrayal, the U.S. sold us to Russia and stabbed us in the back."

And they have reason to be concerned about Russian intentions, I submit, especially since the recently enacted Russian law on defense. You might have heard about this. It's clearly meant to authorize military adventures in Russia's near abroad.

I think the U.S. decision was even more galling because of why the Russians had objected to our previous policy, and therefore why the Administration presumably felt a need to respond. No one took seriously the Russian claims that missile defenses in Poland and the Czech Republic actually threatened Russia, a point made by President Obama himself last Thursday. It wasn't really about the missile defense shield to the Russians, it was about where we wanted to put it.

A senior official of the last administration once noted that the Russians told him that we should put the missile defense shield in England. A senior U.S. official pointed out that from England these missile defense interceptors really could pose a threat to a Russian missile launched against the West. The Russian chuckled and said they weren't really concerned about that.

What they are concerned about is Western military hardware and presence in countries previously under the Soviets' control. It's hard to imagine any Russian quid pro quo that would be worth compromising the principle that we can support our NATO allies, even in Eastern Europe.

It's even harder to justify our turnabout if the Obama administration did not negotiate a quid pro quo from the Russians, and it's not apparent that that was done. Russia's envoy to NATO recently said, "Those who are talking about a concession to Russia are primarily those who are looking for a bargaining chip and seeking extra dividends of some kind from us. It's actual fact the Americans have simply put their own mistake right, and we are not duty bound to pay for someone to put their own mistake right."

Moreover, the Russians seem to be attempting to capitalize on this momentum. On the very day that the President announced his decision to halt the implementation of the third site, Vladimir Putin complained that relations between our two countries were still tainted by, as he put it, "rudiments from the previous era." And he called upon the United States to step up efforts to ease Russia and Belarus and Kazakhstan entry into the World Trade Organization.

Well, I believe everyone knows what's going on here, and that's the problem. Russia will be emboldened by what we did. Countries like Iran and North Korea will take note, and our allies, either those who rely on us -- say, a country like Japan -- or on whom we frequently rely for support -- for example, Great Britain -- will calculate their future policy with this new American realism in mind.

Most distressing, those nations wondering whether to get behind U.S. efforts in the Gulf region, or throw in with Iran now have some new thinking to do about the value of a close relationship with the United States.

Among the many nations which will be nervous about the President's strategy are U.S. friends in the Caucasus. Even before last Thursday, Georgia had reason to be alarmed. We just marked the one-year anniversary of the Russian invasion of that nation. Russia still has not fully withdrawn, despite constant international pressure. And all the while, Russian forces have dug in deep in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

And on that recent anniversary, has Russia been asked to take the steps required of it a year ago, to withdraw from Georgian territory, or was the attention focused on whether Russia would attempt more conquest there? Is that now our baseline in defending the sovereignty of a nation we considered for NATO membership?

Ukraine -- for Russia, Ukraine isn't just a former client state, it's access to a major seaport for the Russian fleet and a source of particularly sensitivity. Of course Ukraine's departure from the USSR triggered the collapse of that political entity. Russian meddling in Ukraine's upcoming election is clear for all to see. One Ukrainian scholar noted that, "Wars and conflicts begin with discussion of them as an option. Now, for the first time in years, the word 'war' is being used here, and it's not dismissed as impossible."

Given Western reaction to the invasion of Georgia and the decision last Thursday, what reason does Russia have to worry if it attempts to protect Russian nationals in Eastern Ukraine, or as seems likely, it simply aids in the toppling of the pro-western President?

Another area that offers insight into this new policy with Russia are the START negotiations. Russia has long been interested in entering into binding arms control treaties with the United States. The reason is clear: Russia knows the United States does not cheat. We abide by international agreements, and that's important to Russia, because if they can lock the United States into reducing our military capacity, they can feel confident that that commitment will be kept.

For example, Russia is greatly concerned about the fact that its nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, its missiles and submarines, for example, are rapidly aging and they're going to be expensive to replace. Russia is also concerned about U.S. capabilities to develop non-nuclear global strike capabilities and missile defenses. And of course Russia doubts its ability to match U.S. capacity.

Russia also sensed the great interest on the part of the incoming American administration in arms control treaties. After all, treaty negotiations mean signing ceremonies on the international stage. For Obama, it's a foreign policy accomplishment. For the Russians, validation of their importance, equivalence with the United States.

There's no question that the START treaty, more specifically the verification and confidence-building measures of the treaty, should not be allowed to expire. Despite the fact that the 1991 START agreement expires this December, the administration decided to pursue a far grander treaty with the Russians than was necessary or can probably be negotiated in the remaining two months before the expiration of the original treaty.

What's more, the administration failed to capitalize on Russia's interest in this treaty by insisting on examining matters of greatest interest to the United States and to our allies, such as Russia's 10-to-1 advantage in tactical nuclear weapons vis-à-vis the United States.

Unfortunately, the Administration's negotiations with the Russians on the START follow-on treaty appear to have less to do with addressing these issues than with furthering the President's pledge of working for a world without nuclear weapons.

Yet as Secretary Gates has noted, Russia is, in fact, increasing its reliance on nuclear weapons, while the U.S. is the only nuclear weapons state without a plan to modernize its nuclear weapons.

In view of the events of last Thursday, the administration has, I suggest, complicated its work in completing this treaty, at least in the U.S. Senate. Senators on both sides of the aisle warned the administration since the beginning of this year not to accede to Russian demands to link START to missile defense.

One cannot even say the administration has chosen to ignore that counsel and agreed with Russia to link strategic defenses with offensive weapons because we appear to have unilaterally conceded a key missile defense point without tying it to a concession on offensive weapons or tactical weapons. There can be no question that this sends the wrong signal to the Russians and to the Senate.

Iran is another opportunity to evaluate the new Obama policy, the effort to persuade Iran to forgo its nuclear weapons program. The President may have hoped that he could get cooperation from Russia with the decision he announced Thursday, and it's possible, but I wouldn't bank on it. And it strikes me that Thursday's announcement will actually complicate our efforts to get other countries to cooperate.

We will soon see whether the gambit will cause Russia to join sanctions, or get Russia to end its involvement in the Iranian ballistic missile program, or terminate its contract to supply advanced air defense systems, such as the Russian S-300 system, to Iran. Early statements by the Russians suggest they're not so far impressed.

Apart from how our new policy will affect the nations who we've tried to enlist to influence Iran, how about Iran itself? Conceding to Russian demands in Eastern Europe is hardly the recipe for convincing the Iranians that we mean business.

Moreover, the U.S. decision means that for now, at least, we've stood down the third GBI site for missile defense to protect the United States from an Iranian attack. How serious can we be?

The next test for the new Obama administration is whether it will support or oppose the new sanctions legislation which I drafted, along with Senators Liebermann and Bayh, that now has 76 bipartisan cosponsors in the Senate, over 200 in the House of Representatives. It deals directly with the import into Iran of refined petroleum products, a real Achilles heel for the Iranians and a matter that the President actually spoke about in support of during his campaign.

The clock is ticking, the Iranians are not talking. The more time passes, the fewer options available. Would it be impolitic to enquire when we might see the fruits of the new reset policy with Iran?

Well, here's my conclusion: The early returns, as I said, of this restart policy are not encouraging. It appears to appease our adversaries and turn our back on friends. I haven't even mentioned South and Central America, where there are examples of the same.

With regard to Iran, most experts believe that some form of regime change that reflects the will of the people there is the only peaceful way to influence their nuclear weapon program. If that's true, Obama's catering to Russian demands and talking directly with the Iranian regime bring to mind the entirely different approach by President Reagan to bring an end to the Soviet Union, the great collapse mourned by Mr. Putin.

I can't help but remember what my friend Natan Sharansky wrote about the first time he realized that the Soviet Union's time was short. Here's what he said in his book. "In 1983 I was confined to an 8-by-10 foot prison cell on the border of Siberia. My Soviet jailers gave me the privilege of reading the latest copy of Pravda. Splashed across the front page was a condemnation of President Ronald Reagan for having the temerity to call the Soviet Union an evil empire."

"Tapping on walls and talking through toilets, word of Reagan's provocation quickly spread throughout the prison. We dissidents were ecstatic. Finally the leader of the free world had spoken the truth, a truth that burned inside the heart of each and every one of us."

A policy of engaging Russia that is based on making Russia's concerns of greater importance than those of our natural allies -- free, democratic people like those in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, is not even -- is not only going to work -- not going to work, excuse me, but it's wrong. It undermines the efforts of Iranians, like those we saw protesting after the June 12th elections, people who would institute a more representative government.

I agree with Lech Walesa and Vaclav Havel, who recently wrote to the President to express their concern about the cost of reset with Russia. Here's what they said: "Strong commitment to common liberal democratic values is essential to our countries. We know from our own historical experience the difference between when the United States stood up for its liberal democratic values and when it did not.

"Our region suffered when the United States succumbed to realism at Yalta, and it benefitted when the United States used its power to fight for principle. That was critical during the Cold War, and in opening the doors of NATO. Had a realist view prevailed in the early 1990s, we would not be in NATO today, and the idea of a Europe whole and free and at peace would be a distant dream."

Well, they're right, and it's a lesson worth remembering rather than resetting. Thank you.

(Applause.)

MR. KAGAN: Well, thank you very much, Senator, for that. I think there's a lot of --

SENATOR KYL: Provocation.

MR. KAGAN: -- a lot of meat to chew over, and I'm going to do my best to put myself in the position of an Obama administration official, and maybe pose some questions that they might pose.

For one thing, you make a pretty one-to-one equation between the Soviet Union of a few years ago and Russia today, and I bet they might ask, is that really a fair comparison? Do you not see any distinction between Putin's Russia and I suppose you might say Brezhnev's Soviet Union?

SENATOR KYL: Sure. But my point was that the United States, in developing a policy with Russia, needs to be clear-eyed about Russian intentions. And that starts with what I believe is first and foremost in their minds when they wake up every morning -- at least this is true of Putin, I believe, and I suspect of Medvedev -- when he says that the greatest catastrophe of the 20th century was the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

And when you see the many efforts on the part of the Russian government to reestablish a degree of control, if not real hegemony over its near abroad, countries that were either under the dominance of the Soviet Union or were actually part of that government, then you have to conclude that a big part of their foreign policy is based upon the proposition that they want to reestablish that control and that influence, which ought to be factored into U.S. thinking.

So apart from the technical change in protection of the United States against a intercontinental ballistic missile attack from Iran that one could discuss with respect to this decision last Thursday, how did our policy relate to what we know is a key part of Russian thinking to establish that control?

We did everything wrong if we wanted to send a signal that they shouldn't even think about extending that kind of control over NATO allies. Everything about the decision -- the way it was made, rolled out, and the reaction that was understandable in Eastern Europe -- suggests that we blew it if we wanted to send a signal that the Russians cannot reestablish the kind of control that they had before.

And that's the sense in which I have made this comparison. I don't mean to suggest that, obviously, Putin is Brezhnev, but on the other hand, I do agree with my Senator, John McCain, who was asked what he saw when he looked into Putin's eyes. He said, I saw three letters, KGB.

MR. KAGAN: I mean, if -- you know, Secretary Gates has an editorial -- I think it's in the Times -- is it in the Times? -- defending the decision. And the administration's argument is, they're not abandoning anybody; at some point down the road some kinds of equipment related to missile defense might wind up on Polish and possibly on Czech soil.

Their argument is that their missile defense program is a smarter, more cost effective, more capable program than that which the Bush administration was going forward with. What's your response to that?

SENATOR KYL: Well, to be fair, the book hasn't been written yet. And that is their allegation, and it could come to pass that much of that, at least some of that, could happen. That's the way that they try to sell it.

And I'd be happy to get into detail about that -- let me just mention a couple details. One of the things they argue is that the GBI, the ground based interceptor that we have in Alaska, for example, is -- that they can substitute for that a real hot and clever version of the standard missile 3, SM-3, ground based, but it's not a missile that has yet been developed, or let alone tested, and I'm not at all confident that it would be as effective against an intercontinental ballistic missile that might be launched against the United States as it would be against an intermediate range missile launched against a site in Europe. I would have confidence of the latter.

But this was never mostly about that. Now, there's an irony here, because I'm talking about the Poles and Czechs and so on, but even as the Russians were mostly concerned about where something was put rather than its capability, so too were the Poles and the Czechs.

The fact that something was put there as part of NATO that mostly protected the United States, rather than NATO, was not the main point. It's certainly a point to me; that's the reason for -- they call it the third site. It's the way to fill in the blanks that the other two American sites leave open.

They argue that in the five-year period or so that it will take -- that it would have taken to insert the GBI system, that this system can actually be up and running and it will be more robust against the shorter-term threats, and they even claim some capability against longer-term threats.

All that remains to be seen. We'll have to appropriate the money, they'll have to have a plan, they'll have to develop a missile, they'll have to test it, it will have to work, Poles and Czechs will -- the Poles will decide they want the missile, and there other issues related to the radar.

All of that could theoretically happen, but again, to me, the thing that I'm talking about today is, whatever all of that is, how does it affect the reset policy with Russia, and how has the decision, as it's been rolled out, how do we evaluate the decision in that context.

And I don't think you can argue that failing to discuss this thoroughly with the Poles and Czechs in advance, letting them get out in front and say, actually this isn't all that bad, it's a change in direction not a termination of the plan, and somehow dealing with that with the Russians in a way that is fair but doesn't simply make a concession to them to lead them to believe they can continue to exert this pressure in Eastern Europe, all of those were deficiencies in this policy, and it was more in that context that I was discussing it.

It would be great to have a technical debate with experts in these armaments to test the thesis of the administration against reality, and I'm certain, because I've spoken with some of the administration experts on it, that there is something to what they say. But that is a debate really yet to unfold.

MR. KAGAN: I think another thing that defenders of this broad policy would say is, look, Russia is a strong power; there's a lot of things we need from Russia: we need help in Afghanistan, or at least providing some way of getting there, and not obstructing it; we need some help in Iran, which perhaps may be forthcoming in the future; and maybe even in a broader sense, we need to be able to cooperate with Russia if we're going to create a stable security environment in Europe.

You know, so what's wrong with reaching out to Putin, dealing with this inescapable reality of Russian power, and trying to come up with a new modus vivendi -- even if you're not blaming Bush or blaming anybody else, don't we need a new modus vivendi with Russia?

SENATOR KYL: Well, all of that is true. I'm not sure about a new modus vivendi. The Bush administration may not have had the most effective policy with the Russians, but in terms of their understanding of what motivated the Russians, I think they would refrain from making a mistake like the Obama administration has made here.

That's why I put in my remarks this statement, that I can't think of a quid pro quo to Russia -- let me back up. The reason we have problems with countries like Russia and China is because we do have a very complex, interdependent relationship. We need them for lots of things, they need us for a lot of things, and so it's hard to always condition decisions in a quid pro quo context, understood.

But there are some basic principles that you can't compromise. And what I said is, it's hard to think of a concession from the Russians that is worth compromising our commitment to the freedom and security of Eastern Europe -- that's bedrock, that's fundamental.

And even as much as we would like to have Russian help with the Iranians, with regard to their nuclear program, I'm not -- to me it's not worth -- in order to try to get them to help us there, it's not worth compromising our principle. Indeed, the fact that we rolled this decision out the way that we did, and the way that it's been reacted to in Eastern Europe, probably sends the signal to the Iranians that might be able to help us out in Iran, don't count on the United States.

That's the point I made quoting Natan Sharansky. You've got to give hope to the people in the captive countries that if they hang in their long enough, we'll find a way to help them gain control of their country and make more sensible policies.

Nobody knows for sure that if the real will of the Iranian people were acted out in a change in the regime there that everything would be hunky dory with regard to their nuclear program, but the opportunity for a change and a better relationship there would certainly exist.

And you undercut the possibility for that foment and hope on the part of the Iranian people -- you undercut that when you seem to make a deal with the devil as is the appearance of the agreement -- or the announcement that was made last Thursday.

MR. KAGAN: You're a highly successful politician, and therefore I think probably have some sense of what public opinion is like on some of these issues. I guess as I look out at the public right now, it's not clear to me that the vast majority of Americans are really concerned about the kinds of issues that you've raised.

They probably think it makes perfect sense to try to have a better relationship with the Russians, to go ahead and have a START agreement, to work out some relationship on these missile defense issues. It's not clear to me that they care very much what's happening in Georgia or Ukraine, and possibly even in Poland and the Czech Republic.

Do you really think that there is a strong body of opinion in the United States that is troubled by what's going on right now in terms of Obama administration policies?

SENATOR KYL: Unfortunately no. I think there is a nascent public concern that can be tapped into when these things occur, and I do think there is strong support for missile defense. There is support, certainly, for being with our allies in Eastern Europe.

But as World War II fades in the memory, and I look out at the audience here today -- mostly folks a lot younger than I am -- it's not even a memory, it's simply something you read in history books. The idea that we were -- that we celebrated captive nations, I guess it was month -- wasn't that what we celebrated, the entire month, reminding ourselves that countries like the Baltic states, for example, were free countries before World War II, and we kept on the agenda that some day they would be free -- that isn't something that's in the conciseness of most Americans today, and it's too bad, because it certainly is in the consciousness of those countries, and it animates Russian policy, I would submit. And that's why it needs to be in the minds of our policymakers, if not the American people.

But I do think the President and certainly those in Congress can help to galvanize public opinion around those actions that require public support when the time comes. We've got a big job to do in Afghanistan. I understand you spoke about that earlier this morning. That's probably agenda item number one that the President likes to go to all the national TV programs and Sunday morning talk shows and address Congress and so on. Let's talk about galvanizing American public opinion around an absolute national security imperative, and that is winning in Afghanistan and saving Pakistan.

MR. KAGAN: Well, a little closer to home, there was recently announced a $2 billion Russian loan for arms purchases to Venezuela. I think there was talk about selling Venezuela 100 T-72 tanks and the famous S-300 missile defense system which Iran is desperate to get and which Russia has not yet provided them.

There's also talk today, I think, a Russian general or admiral was talking about ship visits to Cuba, strengthening the Cuban military. What is your view -- is this all just a lot of smoke and huffing and puffing? Is this something that anybody needs to be concerned about?

SENATOR KYL: We do need to be concerned about it. I mentioned South and Central Americas. I'd love to get into that debate one of these days. It has to do with Honduras as well as Venezuela, and so on.

But part of this is the tit for tat. It's, okay, if you're going to play in our backyard, then we can play in your backyard. Well, to some extent it's a lot less important. If Venezuela has those missiles it's probably a waste of money. If they have a bunch of armament from Russia it's probably a waste of money, unless they intend to become aggressive militarily in the region, say, against Colombia.

But they don't have any reason to fear the United States, so it's not as big a deal. But it, I think, illustrates the fact that the Russians are so obsessed with their near abroad that they would make expensive decisions that are rather foolish in our neighborhood just to remind us of that connection.

MR. KAGAN: Well, just a final question from me, and then open it up to the audience. There's going to be, over the next year or so, a number of significant votes on probably treaties that the administration is going to put forward.

I presume there will be eventually be some kind of vote on a renegotiated START agreement, sometime down the road there will be a vote on Comprehensive Test Ban treaty. All of this is part of a package, I think, that the administration would like to put together for the nonproliferation treaty review.

And it's really, I think, part of the Obama administration's strategy to put more pressure on Iran by having a general effort around the world to reduce nuclear weapons, to reduce -- to eliminate testing of nuclear weapons as a means of their nonproliferation strategy.

Again, these kinds of treaties are going to come before the Senate. Where do you think the Republican Party is going to be on these kinds of agreements?

SENATOR KYL: First, I'm not sure that the Iranian program has anything to do with President Obama's quest to rid the world of nuclear weapons. I think the two are unrelated. One can be used as a handy rationale for the other, but he's been committed to this since his college days, and he's committed to it.

He has announced in his Prague speech the intention of moving forward with both START and CTBT. The START negotiations are hot and heavy as we speak, and the treaty could be submitted to the U.S. Senate late this year.

It may drag on, because rather than re-upping the verification provisions, which everyone I think supports, they're significantly reducing the numbers of nuclear warheads and potentially delivery vehicles, and changing the mix of those things potentially, which could cause some deterioration in U.S. capability vis-à-vis the Russians.

That's why I was a bit critical of the fact that we seem to be so hot to get a treaty for the signing ceremony that it represents that we might be making concessions that are both unnecessary and that are not accompanied by concessions on the part of the Russians.

Having said all of that, if the administration doesn't make too many mistakes in the way it negotiates these numbers, but pays attention to what the Pentagon says is necessary for our defense, and submits a sensible treaty in that regard, I believe that Senate Republicans will join Senate Democrats in supporting the treaty on one big condition, a condition which has already been directly conveyed to the administration, and that is that a nuclear modernization program accompany the submission of the treaty specifically.

The Perry-Schlesinger Commission recommended substantial upgrades in the nuclear infrastructure, delivery systems, warheads themselves, the scientific community's capability, all to bring back our nuclear deterrent capability to the reliable, safe and effective form that it was in maybe 20 years ago.

It has deteriorated significantly, it's in need of a huge injection of new policy and cash, and the Administration has to begin a modernization program in next year's budget to begin to get that facility -- those facilities and program back up to snuff.

If it submits a credible program with good first-year funding in next year's budget, then I believe -- and again, if the numbers are not too crazy, I think the Republicans would be wiling to support that treaty.

The reason for that is that each year's appropriation process enables us to evaluate progress on the modernization program and progress on the implementation of START. And the two can be directly tied together through the congressional appropriation process.

The administration also wants to submit CTBT, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty that was defeated 10 years ago in the U.S. Senate. My guess is when START is over with they will actually submit that treaty. And my hope and expectation is that it will be defeated again.

MR. KAGAN: I lied, I had one more question of a legislative nature. You mentioned the Iran sanctions legislation that you're a cosponsor of and a leading supporter of. The administration is now going into some kind of negotiations with Iran.

I know that Secretary of State Clinton recently said they're not going to talk just to talk; they understand the danger of Iran stretching things out. I get the impression, however, that whatever deadline the administration has in mind is probably end of the year; that they're going to give Iran until the end of the year in order to see if they're serious about talking about their nuclear program.

What is Congress going to do during that period? Do you think that Congress will sort of give the administration that kind of leeway, or is that sanctions legislation going to be pushed?

SENATOR KYL: Well, that's a great question, and that's why I portrayed it as the last test, that I discussed in my opening remarks. The administration says that it's going to look for an early response from the Iranians -- basically, here's the deal, are you ready to talk or not, and if they hedge, the administration folks say that they're going to say, well, then we're out of here. So they may not actually give them until the end of the year.

On the other hand, the Iranians have time and time again proved very clever at tantalizing our administration -- Bush and Obama -- into giving them another week or two to examine the latest proposal and so on. So it could drag out until then.

In the meantime, I have told them that I think it's helpful to them for the U.S. Congress to move forward with this legislation, which was introduced in March, because it demonstrates that the administration does have support to move forward with the sticks part of their negotiating posture -- these do represent real threats to the Iranian regime -- and that we can calibrate the timing of this in such a way that it shouldn't get in the way of any constructive discussions that might actually be taking place, so that if we have a hearing on the bill it comes out of the Senate Banking Committee in the month of October and we schedule it for floor action, we're still looking at the President perhaps signing in the latter part of the year. And again, the timing on all of that stuff could be calibrated.

But it would be nice to both send them the signal in the meantime, and have something ready to go if the talks do break down. That question of course, is will the administration view this as positive and not discourage us from doing that, or will they talk to the Democratic allies in Congress, and say, no, we don't want to muddy the waters. We'll see.

MR. KAGAN: Okay, well, thank you very much. Let's open it up to the floor for people who have questions. I can't see through these lights.

QUESTION: Dan Pollack with the Zionist Organization of America, with the Senator, thanks for all you've done on these Iranian sanctions, but I'm wondering, even if we follow the timetable you just proposed, is the effectiveness of such sanctions really good enough to stop the Iranians and make them change their mind, given how seriously they seem, in this regime, wedded to moving forward with nuclear weapons?

And so the question is even if these sanctions work, even if we get Russian support for them, is that enough to change the Iranian regime's mind? And since the administration does not seem to be pursuing regime change, what are the other options the United States and its allies have if in fact that Iranian acquisition is unacceptable, as everyone involved has said?

SENATOR KYL: Well, that is a great question, and there is no easy way to answer it, but let me just say that a number of things have to work together simultaneously to put another pressure on the Iranian regime or allow the Iranian people to exert such influence that there is regime change in a positive direction in order to potentially change their policy respecting nuclear weapons. A new Iranian regime that is reflective of popular opinion there is not necessarily going to eliminate their program, but there is a much better chance that we will have an opportunity to negotiate with them positively or constructively in that scenario.

I do not think that just one set of sanctions, for example, will work. The benefit of the sanctions I am talking about is they are primarily unilaterally imposed. They are things the United States can do without the help of the Russians or Chinese. The question then is do they then back-fill the Iranians by deciding to send them the refined petroleum products, and what about the companies that would then be involved. But if these sanctions are tightly enough drawn, it would be very hard for them to do that.

The other question is would the Iranian people get mad at us or the regime? And there have been different opinions on that. I think in view of the political situation in Iran today, this kind of pressure could actually redound to our benefit. The Iranians would hold their leadership accountable for the suffering that they end up having to go through. And nobody wants to put the Iranian people through a lot of suffering because, as I said, they are people who do want by and large I think a regime change. They are like a lot of the dissidents in Eastern Europe at the time of détente, they need encouragement from the West. And that is why I said the kind of decision that was announced pulls the rug out from under them as well.

So the short answer to your question is a combination of all of the kind of sanctions, the banking regulations, that the U.S. Treasury Department is still imposing. We need to get a lot of help from our friends around the world to implement those totally, but we have had an impact. All of the different kind of sanction regimes, diplomatic pressure, and the potential threat of military action, all working together, along with other activities that are engaged in, do have the potential for change. Those who do not want a military strike should at least give all of those things the very best shot that they represent. And you undercut that when you send a signal to the Iranian people that we are actually ready to make a deal with their oppressors rather than put pressure on their oppressors.

MS. AMARZADEEGI: My name is Mary Amarzadeegi, and I am an Iranian American working on democracy promotion and human rights promotion in Iran. I am wondering if you can say more about what President Obama can do on the rhetorical front, what can he say about democracy and human rights in Iran, what can he say about the elections that would help? Aside from the sanctions talk, what has been missing in his policy and his rhetoric that could help the cause in Iran? Thank you.

SENATOR KYL: You could probably answer that question better than I could, but that is why I quote Sharansky, Lech Walesa and Vaclav Havel and referred to what Ronald Reagan did. You have to find a way, and it is a needle to thread to be sure, and I respect the President's wisdom of not interjecting himself so thoroughly right after the last election that the United States could be blamed credibly by the Iranian regime. But having said that, he obviously did not go nearly far enough in letting the Iranian people know that we were concerned about this and that one way or another we would try to help find a way to support them rather than seeming to put all of our eggs in the basket of dealing with their oppressive regime.

There is no simple answer to it but Reagan had the style and the timing and the way to do it, and he encouraged people like Lech Walesa in the Polish shipyards and people like Havel in the Czech Republic, and he gave encouragement to people like Sharansky. And people all over Russia I'm sure noted that same thing. So who knows what the final cause of the break-up of these regimes is, but it is a lot of dialogue, as you say, or the words that people in freedom-loving countries do speak and finding a way to do that through broadcasts into those countries and in other ways let them know that if they will keep up their courage and keep up the pressure, there is a point in time when we will be able to help them.

MS. WEST: Diana West with the Washington Examiner. I wondered if you could speak a little bit more about the extent of our alliance on Russian support for our supply line into Afghanistan and whether you think that figured into the missile decision?

SENATOR KYL: I don't know. Part of all of this does have to remain confidential. I would like to think that there were all kinds of back-room deals that we struck with the Russians that will never come to light. And so I hate to be absolutely critical of the Administration because just maybe they cleverly figured out a way to work with the Russians and so on. But based upon everything that you read, I find that impossible to believe. And I also think, as I said, that it is hard to imagine a quid pro quo that is worth undercutting our allies in Eastern Europe, and indeed the whole concept of being free and secure from a threat from Russia.

There are a lot of things we need in terms of cooperation from the Russians. There are a lot of things they want from us, and so there are lots of quid pro quos going on all the time. The trick of course is to marry the right quid with the right quo. But the simple answer, Diane, is I just don't know the answer whether there might have been something else. I doubt it.

MR. MILANASH: My name is Hirish Milanash (phonetic) from George Washington University. I was wondering what is your impression of the EU involvement in this. I am from Europe originally, and it seems that you are seeing this as a U.S./Russia deal, and clearly the European Union has some policies for these member states, so I don't see how you are taking that out of the equation. And the security of those states is not just based on the U.S. involvement. Thank you.

SENATOR KYL: May I just, let me rephrase the question as I understood it. If I'm incorrect, tell me. You are saying there is another factor in the defense of Eastern Europe, the European Union, and am I making a mistake by not including that in my analysis?

MR. MILANASH: Yes.

SENATOR KYL: My reaction would be ask the Poles and Czechs how much they think they could rely on that. I think I would be with the Poles and Czechs on the way they would vote on that, let me put it that way. The European Union is not going to -- we already have NATO, and our allies there aren't standing up I think the way they should, let alone an European Union kind of construct, which nobody can even quite envision yet in a military way. It is all soft power foreign dialogue stuff.

MR. KAGAN: I think I see a hand all the way in the back of the room, so I will stop having "front room prejudice" here.

MR. WALSH: Michael Walsh, Forum One Communications. My question has to do with e-diplomacy, and I wanted to get your perception of the importance of e-diplomacy and whether or not you think the U.S. is making enough of an investment in e-diplomacy at the State Department?

SENATOR KYL: Of what kind of diplomacy?

MR. WALSH: E diplomacy.

SENATOR KYL: E?

MR. WALSH: Yes, electronic diplomacy, the Internet and social media.

SENATOR KYL: Yes. I don't mean to be facetious, could you explain a little bit more what you are referring to, how it would work? Are you talking, for example, about alternative means of communicating in countries like Iran through the Internet?

MR. WALSH: Exactly, using Facebook, social media, other aspects.

SENATOR KYL: Yes, yes, huge potential there, no question about. And I'm not an expert in it. Obviously, our State Department and also the affiliated entities, Radio Liberty and so on, are engaged in that kind of thing and it can be hugely important, but let's also not forget the Radio Europe and Radio Liberty who can do a tremendous job too, actually based in Prague in the Czech Republic.

MR. KAGAN: Just working our way back up again. Yes, ma'am, right back there?

MS. USCOBA: Thank you, Senator Kyl, for seeing it I think in very realistic terms. My name is Marquetta. I am finishing Master's study in international administration, and I'm Czech. So to hear the fact that my country may be again abandoned, and I know that times are different, but this year we are celebrating 20 years of the Velvet Revolution. And yet it took Czech people quite a long time to warm up to another power, because we had been under one power for so long. And it just seems that the new generation finally was warming up and this happened. So I was wondering how do you see -- do you think this decision is going to affect long-term U.S. foreign policy and how is it that the U.S. will be relying on key allies as Czech and Poles. I know we are a small country, but we do have opportunities and means to help and be a valid member. Thank you.

SENATOR KYL: Well, most of what I said in my prepared remarks really go to that point: I am fearful that the decision that was made and the way that it was made and rolled out can have but one effect, and that is to discourage people in the Czech Republic and Poland and other countries that the Russians would like to exert influence over. And that is why we have to be very careful about doing it.

Part of my underlying message, without being too political, was to compare the Obama rhetoric with the reality. It is hard to govern, it is easy to campaign. When you have to make these tough decisions, you have got to be careful. And this was one of the most clumsy diplomatic maneuvers I have ever seen. They have no grounds on complaining about anything that the Bush Administration did given what they did here. And I am going to say that even if you were to concede the technical ballistic missile defense arguments that Bob was getting to earlier, and as I say we can have that debate later, but even if you were to concede that, the message from this, and after all diplomacy and statecraft is a lot about timing and message over even reality sometimes, but the way this was done cannot help but discourage people in a country like the Czech Republic. So we have got to be sensitive to the fact that they have lived under this repressive situation. For a half a century they lived under it, and there are still great pressures from Russia. And I don't think they get a lot of help from other countries in Europe sometimes. So it is up to us to be very careful how we approach these things.

And there is now some cleaning up to do, and unfortunately both governments, in Poland and the Czech Republic are embarrassed because there is a view I suspect among their people that they were not very adept at dealing with the United States or that we felt that we could roll over them or that they didn't matter. Well, that is a terrible situation for allies that we want to be able to depend on us to have to react to that, and they are not going to react by saying, "Well, the United States actually did the right thing." They cannot claim that they knew about it all along. They are going to have to say, "We were dealt with in a very shoddy fashion here, and that is not the way friends treat friends."

And, unfortunately, for Americans it is hard for us to believe the charge that we are unreliable allies because we think we are reliable. We think we are consistent, and that we have done so much good in the world, and we have, we have saved so many people over the years and sacrificed so much, that we can't believe that we are viewed as unreliable, and yet look at the things we do. Time after time after time we act in ways that tell people that we cannot be relied upon, and it is one of the reasons that we have a hard time getting allies in the world.

So part of what I was saying was an indirect criticism of the Obama attacks on Bush, as well as a suggestion that they have got to be much more careful in advancing their foreign policy, to understand what the Russians are really up to here, the sensitivities of people in Eastern Europe, and not to make this kind of mistake and decision again irrespective of what the real arguments are with respect to practical missile defense. The hope would be that over time, they could demonstrate that it is really just a shift in the kind of missile defense. It will still be just as good, if not better, and the Poles and Czechs can be secure that we are putting American people and American equipment, NATO-related, on their soil which further establishes our commitment to help defend them when the time is necessary to do that. But that takes repair work. We would like not to have go back and repair. You would like to get it right the first time around.

Maybe one more question, Bob.

MR. KAGAN: I notice, Senator, you are too polite to ask the question of whether she is not comforted by membership in the EU given that the United States is (inaudible).

(Laughter.)

We have time for one more question. Sir, right here.

SENATOR KYL: I'm preaching diplomacy after all.

MR. KAGAN: No, no, you are very diplomatic. I appreciate that. I make no pretense at diplomacy. Yes, sir, right there, yes?

QUESTION: Senator, you said that if CTBT comes again, it will be defeated in the Senate.

SENATOR KYL: I said it is my hope and expectation. I am not guaranteeing it.

QUESTION: Can I draw a conclusion that at least you will vote against it?

SENATOR KYL: I will not only vote against it, but I will lead the defense against it. I will do everything within my power to see that it is defeated.

And what I would like to invite you to do, Bob, at another occasion, if you are interested, I would love to have a debate with someone who is for the treaty or to discuss it because, if anything, conditions in the last 10 years have made it less desirable for us to ratify that treaty than it was 10 years ago.

QUESTION: Senator, you know that India is one of the countries that is holding that treaty, and I do remember one time you were opposed to India's nuclear tests but then proudly you supported the Civilian Nuclear Bill.

SENATOR KYL: You are talking about the United States?

QUESTION: Yes.

SENATOR KYL: Not me personally.

QUESTION: What is your situation with respect to what would you like India to do on the CTBT this time?

SENATOR KYL: Well, again, I assume by "you," you mean the United States government?

QUESTION: Exactly -- no, no, I'm asking your opinion.

SENATOR KYL: Okay, let me answer both ways. The position of the Obama Administration will be to put a lot of pressure on India to ratify the treaty.

QUESTION: Exactly.

SENATOR KYL: I will oppose that. But I think people need to do what they think is in their best interest. And when you live in dangerous neighborhoods and you have national security reasons to want to protect yourself, you are going to do what is necessary for that, which is why I think these treaties that ostensibly give up -- not ostensibly -- that gives up this right on the fuzzy notion that your national interests will be just as well off if you give it up, that that is a fuzzy notion. That is not realistic. This so-called "new realism" gets all starry-eyed when it comes to things like arms control treaties. And that is why I don't think it is realistic for the United States to expect countries, like Israel, Pakistan, India, Iran, and others, to ratify the treaty. And it does take all those countries that have to ratify it that have said they won't for it to come into force, so I doubt seriously that it ever will come into force, which is another reason for the United States not to ratify it. But the argument is, well, if we do, then maybe some of them will. I would like to see the names of the countries that will if we ratify it. I don't think that will happen.

QUESTION: Thank you.

MR. KAGAN: Well, thank you, Senator, very much. First of all, thank you, audience, for very intelligent questions and thank you for your time.

(Applause.)